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Industrielles Erbe in Ostdeutschland: vergessen, wiederentdeckt, neu erfunden?

In diesem Beitrag berichtet Juliane Tomann von zwei Workshops zum industriellen Erbe der DDR.

Was macht das industrielle Erbe im Osten Deutschlands aus und inwiefern unterscheidet es sich von den in Westdeutschland geprägten Begriffen und Praktiken der Industriekultur? Bereits in den 1990er-Jahren entwickelte sich eine vielgestaltige Auseinandersetzung mit dem industriellen Erbe der DDR, die von den politischen Großdebatten der „Nachwendezeit” weitgehend überschattet wurde.

What characterises industrial heritage in eastern Germany, and to what extent does it differ from the concepts and practices of industrial culture that took shape in western Germany? As early as the 1990s, a multifaceted examination of the industrial heritage of the GDR began, though it was largely overshadowed by the major political debates of the ‘post-reunification era’.


7. Juni 2026 – eine der vielen E-Mails an diesem Tag zieht meine Aufmerksamkeit mit dem Betreff „Bitte um Unterstützung. Offener Brief zum Erhalt….“ auf sich. Mehr kann ich in der Betreffzeile meines Mailprogramms nicht lesen. Ich öffne die E-Mail: Ein offener Brief für den Erhalt der Erzgebirgsschanze im sächsischen Johanngeorgenstadt. Ich erfahre, dass es sich um ein Frühwerk des Brutalismus aus dem Jahr 1962 handelt, der, so lese ich, dem „Baustoff Beton neue Form- und Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten“ verliehen habe. Die geschichtsträchtige DDR-Sportstätte sei akut vom Abriss bedroht, so der Brief weiter, denn die Stadt verweigere den Eintrag in die Denkmalliste, obwohl es sich bei der Erzgebirgsschanze um einen der „prägendste(n) verbliebene(n) Vertreter dieser Gattung im Freistaat“ handele. Absender der E-Mail ist das Netzwerk INDUSTRIE.KULTUR.OST, das sich „ehrenamtlich für bedrohte Industriekultur“ im Osten Deutschlands einsetzt.

Industrielles Erbe in transgenerationeller Perspektive

Das Engagement für die Erzgebirgsschanze und die baulichen Hinterlassenschaften der Sportgeschichte der DDR steht sinnbildlich für die wesentlich breiter angelegten, intensiven Bemühungen des Netzwerkes INDUSTRIE.KULTUR.OST, die baugeschichtlichen Spuren des Industriezeitalters im Osten Deutschlands zu dokumentieren, zu sichern und langfristig zu bewahren. Auf einem Workshop am Technikmuseum in Magdeburg im April 2026 zum Thema „Emergenz und Gegenwart des Industriellen Erbes der DDR“ war ich beeindruckt von den ästhetischen Fotografien verlassener Industriebauwerke von Klingenthal bis Rostock, die ein Mitglied des Netzwerkes dort präsentierte. Daher trug ich mich in die E-Mailliste der ehrenamtlich Aktiven ein.

Johanngeorgenstadt. Foto: Christian Bier,  Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 (2014)

Neben dem Netzwerk versammelte der Workshop eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Initiativen, Zusammenschlüsse und Vereine, die sich mit verschiedenen Prägungen, Motivationen und Zielsetzungen mit den materiellen oder immateriellen Hinterlassenschaften des Industriezeitalters auf dem Gebiet der ehemaligen DDR beschäftigen. Das verbindende Element zwischen ihnen: die meisten von ihnen tun dies ohne eigene biographische Bezüge zur Zeit vor 1989, ihre Erfahrungen sind – zumindest bei einigen – vermittelt über die Generation ihrer Eltern. Bewegt haben die Diskutierenden Fragen danach, was junge Menschen ohne eigene biographische Berührungspunkte dazu motiviert, sich so intensiv mit der Industriegeschichte – auch der DDR – zu beschäftigen. Bringt die neue Generation mit veränderten Fragen auch einen kritischen Umgang mit der Industriekultur und der damit verbundenen Transformation in Ostdeutschland in den Diskurs ein? Die Arbeit des dezentral organisierten Netzwerkes passte damit genauso gut zum thematischen Fokus der Veranstaltung wie die bereits langjährigen Bemühungen stärker etablierter Institutionen, in denen Industriekultur im Osten Deutschlands diskutiert, ausgestellt und ausgehandelt wird. Ferropolis – die Stadt aus Eisen – gehört mit der Ausstellung und Inszenierung bergbaulicher Großgeräte genauso dazu wie das INIK – Institut neue Industriekultur aus Cottbus.

Ferropolis. Foto: gravitat-OFF Creative Commons Attribution 2.0, Wikimedia Commons (2010)

Neue Industriekultur?

Industriekultur ist als Begriff in der deutschen Erinnerungs- und Geschichtskultur inzwischen fest verankert. Geprägt im Zuge des langfristigen Strukturwandels und der damit einhergehenden Deindustrialsierungsprozesse in Westdeutschland seit den 1960er-Jahren, ging es etwa in den hochindustrialisierten Orten des nordrhein-westfälischen Ruhrgebiets darum, den Wegfall oder die Umgestaltung industrieller Arbeitsverhältnisse, hier prägend im Bergbau und den anschließenden verarbeitenden Gewerben, mit identitätssichernden Angeboten zu begleiten und die Erinnerung an das Industriezeitalter zu bewahren. Heute bezeichnet Industriekultur ganz allgemein den gesellschaftlichen Umgang mit den Hinterlassenschaften des Industriezeitalters, der an musealisierten und kommodifizierten Orten wie der Völklinger Hütte, dem Erzbergwerk Rammelsberg oder der Zeche Zollverein oft in rostroter Ästhetik daherkommt. Spätestens mit der Internationalen Bauausstellung Emscher Park (1989-1999) avancierte Industriekultur zur kultur-, landschafts- und beschäftigungspolitischen Integrations- und Abfederungsidee, wobei hier auch die Veranstaltungs- und Tourismuswirtschaft bedient wurde. Diese Projekte waren und sind in einem Maße erfolgreich, dass sie bis heute die Wahrnehmung dessen prägen, was in Deutschland überhaupt als Industriekultur gelten kann.1

Soweit – so bekannt und gut erforscht. Eine der (begriffsgeschichtlich) spannendsten Fragen ist, ob und, wenn ja, wie der Terminus mit den Realitäten im Osten Deutschlands nach der Vereinigung der beiden deutschen Staaten in Einklang gebracht wurde. Das Gebiet der ehemaligen DDR durchlief nach 1989 eine massive Deindustrialisierung mit einem Strukturbruch, der seinesgleichen in der deutschen Geschichte sucht, in einem extremen Zeitraffer und in der Verflechtung aus politischer, wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Transformation. Der dabei anfallende „Schutt des Sozialismus“ war eine Bürde und landete Großteils auf dem Müllhaufen der Geschichte. Industriekultur und Erinnerung an industrielle Arbeit? Fehlanzeige, könnte man etwas vorschnell schlussfolgern. Während unmittelbar nach 1989 gesellschaftlich und politisch intensiv über die Bewertung der DDR-Vergangenheit und ihre Rolle in der deutschen Geschichte debattiert wurde, entwickelte sich jedoch zeitgleich und von den politischen Großentwicklungen überschattet eine intensive Auseinandersetzung mit der industriellen Vergangenheit in den sogenannten neuen Bundesländern. Diese wurde bislang weitgehend übersehen, obwohl sie die Entstehung des industriellen Erbes im Osten Deutschlands entscheidend prägte.2 Ein von westdeutschen Industriegebieten her gedachter Begriff der Industriekultur kann die ostdeutsche Entwicklung nach 1989/90 jedoch schwer erfassen und die häufig anzutreffende Diagnose einer „nachholenden“ Entwicklung der Industriekultur in Ostdeutschland3 ist im Grunde fehlgeleitet.

Blick in die Lagerhalle des Technikmuseums Magdeburg. Foto: Juliane Tomann.

„Bottom-up“ Industriekultur

Davon, dass die Auseinandersetzung mit den „sozialistischen Altlasten“ auch in der direkten „Nachwendezeit“ ausgesprochen vielgestaltig war, konnten sich die Teilnehmer*innen bereits in einem ersten Workshop überzeugen, der im Oktober 2025 in den Räumen des Montanhistorischen Dokumentationszentrums (montan.dok) des Deutschen Bergbau-Museums Bochum, Leibniz-Forschungsmuseum für Georessourcen (DBM) stattgefunden hatte. Ähnlich wie die Magdeburger Veranstaltung bildete die Frage der „Emergenz des Industriellen Erbes der DDR“ den Ausgangspunkt der Diskussion. In Bochum kamen jedoch diejenigen zu Wort, die sich in der Zeit direkt vor und nach 1989 im Osten Deutschlands für den Erhalt industrieller Stätten eingesetzt hatten. Die Vertreter*innen dieser bottom up-Initiativen aus Brandenburg/Havel, Thale, Deuben, Ronneburg oder Senftenberg berichteten von ihren Strategien und Praktiken des Bewahrens und Behaltens in den unterschiedlichen Regionen im Osten Deutschlands. Wir haben über Handlungsspielräume und -möglichkeiten sowie Konflikte und Kontroversen innerhalb, aber auch im sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und politischen Umfeld der Akteur*innen diskutiert. Die Teilnehmer*innen machten durchaus auch auf Konfliktpotential aufmerksam. Nicht allen schien der Erhalt der als marode, überaltert und ineffizient geltenden DDR-Wirtschaftsinfrastruktur sinnhaft und die Aktiven berichteten, dass ihre Bemühungen außerhalb ihrer Initiativen teilweise als überholt, fortschrittshemmend oder rückwärtsgewandt wahrgenommen wurden.

Das industrielle Erbe Ost als Provokation?

Die anwesenden westdeutschen Kolleg*innen überraschte vor allem, dass in den 1990er-Jahren zahlreiche Frauen in den Bewahrungsinitiativen der DDR-Industriehinterlassenschaften aktiv waren. Insbesondere das Beispiel des Stahlwerkes in Brandenburg an der Havel führte dies eindrücklich vor Augen, waren doch die Protagonist*innen des (Selbst)Historisierungsprozesses dieses Betriebes Frauen. Darüber hinaus dürfte der hohe Anteil weiblicher Akteur*innen dem Umstand der vergleichsweise hohen weiblichen Erwerbstätigkeit in der DDR geschuldet sein. Auch hier zeigt sich, dass die etablierten Narrative über die industrielle Erbewerdung nicht nur westlich geprägt sind, sondern häufig auch eine männlich dominierte Perspektive transportieren. Wie stark Prozesse der industriellen Erbewerdung in Ostdeutschland gewohnte Interpretationen herausfordern, zeigte sich auch darin, dass die Akteur*innen in ihren Ausführungen immer wieder auf die landschaftliche Einbindung der Industriestätten Bezug nahmen — auf das „Territorium”, wie sie es nannten. Industrielles Erbe wurde hier nicht allein über historische Zeitschichten, sondern wesentlich über den Raum gedacht. In den westlich geprägten Erzählungen über industrielle Erbewerdung ist diese räumliche Selbstverortung weniger ausgeprägt.

Workshopteilnehmer:innen. Foto: Michael Farrenkopf.

Aufschlussreich war, welche Bedeutung Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen in den 1990er-Jahren spielten: Für viele der anwesenden Initiativen waren sie überhaupt erst die Voraussetzung, sich der Bewahrung des industriellen Erbes der DDR anzunehmen. Solche mittel- und langfristig eher prekären Finanzierungen waren nicht nur für die 1990er-Jahre herausfordernd. Sie schreiben sich, wenn auch unter anderen Vorzeichen, gegenwärtig fort – steht doch der Erhalt des institutionalisierten Erbes immer wieder auf dem Prüfstand.

Die Diskussionen in beiden Workshops konnten viele der zentralen Herausforderungen rund um die Erbewerdung industrieller Hinterlassenschaften in Ostdeutschland bereits anreißen, ohne sie freilich erschöpfend zu klären. Genau hier setzt ein neues Forschungsprojekt an: Ab Februar 2027 nimmt ein deutsch-polnisches Team diese Fragen wieder auf, gefördert von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft und dem polnischen National Science Center. Im Zentrum steht diesmal ein systematischer Vergleich: “Das industrielle Erbe in Ostdeutschland und Polen neu verhandeln: Akteure, Prozesse und Praktiken der Erbewerdung in vergleichender Perspektive (1989–2020er Jahre)”.


Mehr zum Projekt: https://gepris.dfg.de/project/583854756/2


Die Workshops in Magdeburg und Bochum wurden initiiert von Dr. Michael Farrenkopf, Dr. Torsten Meyer (beide DBM) und Prof. Dr. Juliane Tomann (Universität Regensburg) und vom Leibniz-Forschungsverbund Wert der Vergangenheit gefördert.


Dieses bislang kaum erforschte Feld soll ab 2027 in einem deutsch-polnischen Vergleichsprojekt untersucht werden.


1 Zum Begriff Industriekultur siehe: Torsten Meyer; Michael Farrenkopf: Industriekultur, in: Martin Sabrow/Achim Saupe (Hg.): Handbuch Historische Authentizität, Göttingen 2022, S. 235–242; zum Ruhrgebiet Helen Wagner: Vergangenheit als Zukunft? Geschichtskultur und Strukturwandel im Ruhrgebiet, Köln 2022

2 Siehe dazu Marcus Böick; Jan Kellershohn; Juliane Tomann: Unter den Trümmern. Plädoyer für eine Erforschung ostdeutscher Industriekulturen, in: Jahrbuch Deutsche Einheit 5 (2024), S. 191-209.

3 Vgl. zum Beispiel Slotta, Rainer: Minderwertiges Mineral – Minderwertige Geschichte? Museale Präsentationen zur Geschichte der Braunkohle in Deutschland, in: Udo Mainzer (Hg.): Cöllnisch Umbra. Das rheinische Braunkohlenrevier als Denkmallandschaft, Petersberg 2002, S. 13-25.


Titelbild: © Christian Keybets auf Unsplash

Memory, Heritage and Emotion in Crises: then and there, here and now

Susannah Eckersley considers the significance of memory, historic sites and everyday interactions within contested emotional processes of heritage.

Exploring two locations in Griebnitzsee – the lakeshore and Potsdam University campus – I consider the significance of memory, historic sites and everyday interactions within contested emotional processes of heritage: “the medium through which senses of place are created from senses of time”1.

Anhand zweier Orte in Griebnitzsee – dem Seeufer und dem Campus der Universität Potsdam – setze ich mich mit der Bedeutung von Erinnerung, historischen Stätten und alltäglichen Interaktionen im Rahmen umkämpfter emotionaler Prozesse des Kulturerbes auseinander: „dem Medium, durch das aus Zeitempfindungen Ortsempfindungen entstehen“.


Sitting on the border between the states of Berlin and Brandenburg – previously the border between West Berlin and the GDR – this quiet wealthy area of villas, manicured gardens and tree-lined streets has witnessed some of the major historical events of the 20th century, including housing the parties involved in the 1945 Potsdam Conference. Today, the road to the station at Griebnitzsee is part of the Berliner Mauerweg, several of the waterfront villas belong to foundations such as the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung and the University of Potsdam has one of its campuses at a site with a complex history at Griebnitzsee2. The memory of the past makes its presence felt through larger symbolic gestures such as these, as well as being layered through everyday interactions within the place itself.

Consideration of how emotion and affect relate to each other has brought Heritage Studies and Memory Studies closer together, with memory seen as “an affective tool for the co-constitution of embodied political narratives” (Tolia-Kelly, Waterton and Watson 2017) and emotions as being “put to use when the past is mobilised as ‘heritage’ in the present” (Smith, Wetherell and Campbell 2018). In Sara Ahmed’s book, ‘The Cultural Politics of Emotion,’ she sets herself the task of addressing the question, ‘what do emotions do?.’ She focuses on whether “attending to emotions might show us how all actions are reactions, in the sense that what we do is shaped by the contact we have with others”.

Taking this point further, I wanted to consider emotion together with both memory and heritage (taken in a broad sense as engagements with the past, whether these are officially designated as ‘heritage’ or not). In other words, to paraphrase Ahmed, my interest is in attending to emotions to consider actions and reactions, connected to the sense that what we do is also shaped by the contact we have with the past within the present. In doing so, I draw on Sharon Macdonald’s notion of ‘past-presencing’ as a crucial part of what she describes as a ‘memory-heritage-identity complex’ within which the past continually takes on new meanings attributed to it over time by different people and communities.

Exploring the Griebnitzsee area on foot in the cooler evenings, I quickly discovered that only very few access routes to the lake and some short paths along the shore were open, despite our map showing a footpath – the Uferweg – all along the waterfront. Instead, many of the villas enjoy expansive lawns down to the lakeside, with private jetties for pleasure boats or swimming parties. The footpath ends at locked gates and fences where nettles and brambles run riot, deterring unwanted visitors.

Away from the Uferweg, on several of the fences and gates nearby, we noticed large blue X signs and protest stickers on the public information boards with the slogan ‘Freies Ufer.’ Here emotions clearly run high.

During the Cold War and division of Germany, the area of Griebnitzsee was part of a military exclusion zone, with the lakeside border patrolled by soldiers on what is now the Uferweg3. Following the Wende and reunification, the path was accessible to and used by the general public, until 2009, when some villa owners began to block access to the path and to the shore from their property4. Since this time there has been both a legal dispute5 and a civic protest movement6, with the city of Potsdam publicly stating their intention to make the Uferweg accessible again for Potsdamers and their visitors.7 Sections of the Uferweg that do remain open often include information boards or memorials, such as the Memorial to the Berlin Wall at Stubenrauchstrasse, on the Berlin-Potsdam (formerly West Berlin – GDR) border (see title picture).8

The emotions raised by the different expectations for public access to the lake shore divide the local residents, echoing past injustices of lack of freedom due to the GDR border, while resonating differently across different political and social milieux. The protest movement appears to be actively using emotional and emotive arguments connected to historical political injustice to make their case, a strategy often deployed by groups wishing to attract attention – including social movements and populist political groups.

The university campus and student housing behind the station at Griebnitzsee has brought a more diverse young population to the area, most of whom will not have been born until well after the Wende, and many of whom are international students. The history of the campus is briefly and factually presented in interpretation boards near to the station9, setting out that these buildings were used by the National Socialist, Soviet, and GDR regimes in turn, with the site being the main depot of the German Red Cross (DRK) from 1896 to 1945. Without providing any contextual information on the DRK’s complicity within the National Socialist apparatus, the information board simply states that ‘forced laborers from a nearby prisoners-of-war camp had to build the new houses’ [sic: for ‘houses’ read the German Red Cross administrative buildings], and that ‘prisoners from Sachsenhausen concentration camp had to build an air raid shelter’ following a bomb attack in March 1944.

While older residents of the area and academics from the university may be familiar with the significant implications of these very brief statements, they will most likely be lost on everyday passers-by, such as international students, the occasional tourist or holidaymaker on a cycle excursion – that is if any of them stop to read the boards. The factual nature of the boards might provide the essentials deemed relevant to an architectural history of the site and its buildings, but it fails to embed it within the wider context of social and political history, or to consider its audience. To a semi-outsider, such as myself, the absence of any human element to the history presented, let alone anything that acknowledges the emotional impact of these events, is jarring.

These two examples, which are located relatively close together, both connecting past and present, both very much connected to place and people, and yet each with such different contemporary reach and resonances, struck me as indicative of two significant challenges.

Firstly, how can temporally distant histories – such as of National Socialism and the GDR – be communicated effectively to a public which is both increasingly diverse and relatively disconnected from the traces of the past that remain in the places they inhabit? The transient population of the student community living and learning on a site tainted by historical complicity, apparently unaware – despite the interpretation boards – sits in interesting contrast to the long-term residents using the memory of past wrongs to fight for access to the waterfront, cut off first by the GDR regime and now by wealthy villa owners.

Secondly, how can the emotions that might be stirred up – either by historical injustices or by perceived contemporary injustices – in public (and semi-public) spaces with historically ‘tainted’ pasts, be recognised without either over-emotionalising or over-detaching? Emotive topics, particularly where they relate to memories of difficult past experiences, are readily mobilised by extreme actors keen to shape popular opinion and to gather support for extreme political views. Although the Freies Ufer protest movement is a civic, rather than political group, some voices in the discourse around the lakeshore path echo histories and ideologies of Enteignung10, the expropriation of private property – an issue which raises political hackles alongside memory and emotions.

Keeping the tone and content of information boards – such as those at Griebnitzsee Campus – detached and factual ostensibly follows the memory culture tradition in the Federal Republic of Germany, which aims not to emotionalise or manipulate the public. Guided by the Beutelsbacher Konsens, this is predicated on an earnest desire to ensure that historical education avoids the pitfalls of becoming part of political propaganda – as it did under fascist and communist regimes. However, where a choice is made that such heritage interpretation, museum exhibition, or other form of formalised memory culture should take a detached, factual approach with minimal explanatory or contextual information, it runs the risk of sounding too formal and administrative in tone and style – given the emotionality of the subject – which may create a negatively loaded silence for some readers, rather than being seen as neutral. At the same time, the highly emotive tone and historical injustice approach that appears to have been taken by the Freies Ufer movement, is also problematic, in that it risks increasing the heat of the argument and so polarising and overly politicising the discussions about the future of the lakeshore.

During my fellowship in Potsdam, I was often reminded of the enduring significance of memory and emotion in contemporary concerns, whether big political debates or the more everyday, such as access to a footpath, or the remembering and forgetting of historical places. The emotionality of memory can be powerful and dangerous, yet to entirely reject it whether in relation to education, or civic political debate, is to miss both an opportunity and to face a new risk. Recognising the Janus-faced power of emotionality – alongside that of rationality – is essential during times of increasing political polarisation, when new borders are being drawn in people’s heads. Within contemporary crises, the more detached ‘there and then’ of history is increasingly entangled with the emotive ‘here and now’ of politics, resulting in a complex and sometimes contradictory interlayering of time, place, emotion, memory and heritage. And yet it is precisely these flawed and unruly interlayerings which seem to hold power within our societies.


1 Ashworth and Graham 2005, p.11

2 A map with the border and information panels and memorials is available here: https://www.stiftung-berliner-mauer.de/en/stiftung/karte-der-erinnerungsorte?nid=1952

3 A short history of a similar situation at the Gross Glienicke Lake written by Winfried Sträter is available on the Potsdam city website, https://www.potsdam.de/system/files/documents/Uferweggeschichte.pdf

4 https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/die-freie-landschaft-wenn-die-natur-zum-politikum-wird-102.html

5 https://taz.de/FREIES-UFER/!5050288/

6 https://griebnitzseeufer.de/de/willkommen/; https://www.openpetition.de/petition/online/ufer-frei-gesetzesaenderung-fuer-durchgaengige-uferwege

7 https://www.potsdam.de/de/uferweg-griebnitzsee

8 https://www.orte-des-erinnerns.de/igof_memorials/mauergedenkstaette-griebnitzsee/

9 The text and images from which are also on the University of Potsdam website: https://www.uni-potsdam.de/de/zeitzeichen/standorte/griebnitzsee/das-hauptlager-des-deutschen-roten-kreuzes-1896-1945 in 2016 a publication on the history of the Griebnitzsee campus was published by the Law Faculty of the University of Potsdam https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/9471

10 https://taz.de/Enteignung-von-Mauergrundstuecken/!5114954/; https://www.morgenpost.de/bezirke/steglitz-zehlendorf/article227132095/Streit-um-Uferweg-Enteignet-die-Enteigner.html


References

Ahmed, Sara, 2014, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

Ashworth, G. and Graham, B. 2005 Senses of Place: Senses of Time, Aldershot: Ashgate

Bliuc, A. M., Yilmaz, I., Norrie, R., De Groot Heupner, S., Morieson, N., & Belanger, M. J. (2026). The emotional logic of populist communication: a systematic review. Information, Communication & Society, 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2026.2639567

Goodwin, J., Jasper, J.M. and Polletta, F. (2004). Emotional Dimensions of Social Movements. In The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (eds D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule and H. Kriesi). https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470999103.ch18

Macdonald, S. (2012). Presencing Europe’s Pasts. In A Companion to the Anthropology of Europe (eds U. Kockel, M. Nic Craith and J. Frykman). https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118257203.ch14

Macdonald, S. (2013). Memorylands: Heritage and Identity in Europe Today (1st ed.). Abingdon: Routledge

Smith, Laurajane, Margaret Wetherell, Gary Campbell, 2018, Emotion, Affective Practices, and the Past in the Present, Abingdon: Routledge

Tolia-Kelly, Divya, Emma Waterton, Steve Watson, 2017, Heritage, Affect and Emotion, Abingdon: Routledge


All photos by Susannah Eckersley.

Imperial inheritances and the politics of planning in Chișinǎu

Abigail Karas examines how planning categories in urban governance selectively mobilise historical narratives.


How do imperial legacies continue to shape contemporary identity and urban governance? Focusing on Chișinău, Abigail Karas examines how planning categories selectively mobilise historical narratives, shaping both perceptions of the past and visions of the city’s future.

Inwiefern prägen imperiale Vergangenheiten heute noch Identität und Verwaltung von Städten? Am Beispiel von Chișinău untersucht Abigail Karas, wie planerische Kategorien historische Narrative selektiv bedienen und damit sowohl die Wahrnehmung der Vergangenheit als auch Visionen für die Zukunft der Stadt beeinflussen.


The Republic of Moldova has long occupied a distinctive position at the intersection of empires. As a historical borderland shaped by Ottoman, Tsarist, Romanian, and Soviet rule, Moldova offers a particularly revealing case for examining how changing political regimes and contested state projects have reconfigured collective identities and historical narratives over time. This layered historical experience makes Moldova an especially valuable context for understanding how multiple and at times competing forms of belonging are produced and negotiated through the intertwined processes of territorial governance, collective memory, and identity formation. Rather than inheriting a singular fixed identity, Moldovans continually negotiate a layered set of historical experiences, where imperial legacies are selectively mobilised in contemporary processes of heritage-making.

Russian Imperial-era Map of Chișinǎu, 1887. Wikimedia commons.

Heritage is never a neutral record of the past. It is produced through processes of selection and interpretation that determine which histories become visible and which are pushed to the margins. My research examines how imperial and anti-imperial historical imaginaries are negotiated within local practices of heritage-making and urban development, focusing on the ways in which Moldova’s pre-colonial, colonial, and Soviet inheritances have contributed to identity formation and policymaking since the country’s independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991. In my work I pay particular attention to the symbolic and practical functions of urban branding and place-making, exploring how these strategies operate both as mechanisms for economic development and also through which particular visions of the city are constructed and governed. This is because the built environment is not simply the material result of historical processes; it actively participates in shaping social memory, political legitimacy, and claims to urban ownership. In this context, urban branding policies represent more than market-oriented strategies aimed at attracting investment or tourism. They also establish narratives about which aspects of the city are valuable and worthy of preservation.

In Moldova, these processes of heritage-making are complicated by the coexistence of the above-mentioned competing historical attachments, shaped by imperial, national, linguistic, and local experiences, each of which offers a different lens through which the past can be claimed. This occasionally leads to tensions, for example, in debates over language education, the discourse surrounding any potential unification with Romania, or in relations between the country’s autonomous Gagauz region (home to an Orthodox Christian, Turkic-language speaking minority) and the central government in Chișinău. Within these debates, local and ethnic identities intersect with questions of geopolitical orientation, whether toward Russia or the European Union. These competing attachments do not remain confined to political discourse, they are also materialised within public commemorative practice and, crucially, in urban space. The city provides an important site through which these competing historical claims can be traced, as different layers of political authority, spatial organisation, and collective memory become embedded in the urban fabric.

Soviet-era cadastral survey. ANA DGAN F.R-281 inv.1 d.1

The City as Archive

My research situates contemporary urban identity practices within the historical evolution of urban space, treating the city itself as an archive through which the layered legacies of empire, state socialism, and post-socialist market transformation can be examined. Rather than treating urban development and planning history as a linear succession of replaced spatial orders, I approach historical cadastral surveys (documents which define property boundaries), successive master plans, zoning schemes, street networks, land-use patterns, and building typologies as interacting spatial layers. These materials reveal the city’s development not to be a simple progression from one political system to another, but a continual process of interruption, adaptation, and coexistence. Earlier spatial arrangements frequently remain embedded within contemporary urban structures, continuing to influence how the city functions and how it is governed.

Planning categories inherited from previous political systems continue to shape investment decisions, administrative practices, and interpretations of urban value. For example, street networks established under previous imperial administrations continue to organise circulation patterns centuries later, while property boundaries created through earlier cadastral systems remain embedded within contemporary ownership regimes and influence present possibilities for construction and redevelopment. In the capital Chișinău, the contemporary landscape therefore reflects overlapping forms of authority and identification produced through the successive forms of rule that the country experienced. These earlier spatial regimes should be understood as active components of the city’s present functioning rather than as archaeological remnants of previous eras. They organise movement, regulate development, structure administrative decision-making, and influence contemporary understandings of what constitutes valuable urban space.

The New General Urban Plan

These dynamics are especially visible in this year’s announcement by the city’s mayor Ion Ceban of plans to formulate a new General Urban Plan for Chișinǎu, which is intended to guide municipal development until 2040 (the previous plan, approved in 2007, was in effect until 2025). The proposed framework divides the city into four principal development zones: the historic city centre, inner residential neighbourhoods, peripheral districts, and suburban territories. At first glance, these categories appear to represent a technical administrative framework designed to coordinate investment, infrastructure provision, conservation policy, and future redevelopment. However, these classifications also selectively activate particular historical narratives and embed specific interpretations of the city’s past into contemporary planning practice as each of these four zones articulates a specific historical narrative about the city’s development.

On the edges of the city’s Rîșcani district. Photo: Abigail Karas.

The area designated as the ‘historic centre’ largely corresponds to the urban district consolidated during Russian imperial rule, characterised by its orthogonal street grid and significant nineteenth-century Tsarist architectural heritage, alongside important interwar Romanian structures (an interactive map is available here). In contrast, areas preserving elements of earlier pre-imperial road networks and urban morphology, with an irregular street pattern that follows the contours of the landscape and which are classified as ‘inner residential neighbourhoods’, occupy a less prominent position within official heritage imaginaries, despite containing a number of recognised heritage objects. This distinction reveals that the category of ‘historic’ does not necessarily refer simply to chronological age. Instead, it reflects particular narratives about statehood, urban modernity, architectural value, and cultural significance.

Beyond the centre, ‘peripheral districts’ are predominantly associated with Soviet spatial planning, characterised by industrial zoning, standardised housing estates, and modernist principles of urban organisation. Meanwhile, ‘suburban territories’ incorporate former independent villages gradually absorbed into the expanding municipality, alongside newer forms of low-density residential development associated with post-independence market transformations. These spatial categories therefore correspond to different phases of urban growth structured by distinct political and ideological regimes, which continue to shape how Chișinău is understood.

On București street in the city centre. Photo: Abigail Karas.

The current General Urban Plan project consequently performs more than the administrative classification of existing urban space. It re-inscribes successive imperial and post-imperial spatial orders onto the contemporary city under the appearance of objective technical planning. Categories such as ‘historic centre’, ‘periphery’, and ‘suburb’ may feel neutral or technical, but they are not. They are built on assumptions about what counts as ‘heritage’ or ‘modern’, actively producing particular understandings of space by determining where conservation efforts will be concentrated, where investment will be prioritised, and which forms of urban development will be considered desirable. Planning categories are therefore inherently performative. In making these choices, they shape the future by selectively activating certain historical narratives while obscuring others. The apparently neutral language of urban administration contains deeper assumptions about heritage, modernity, and legitimate forms of development. Through these classifications, Chișinău’s experience of various forms of imperial rule are institutionalised within contemporary governance practices, demonstrating how historical layers continue to structure the physical city and also the political processes through which urban futures are imagined and produced.


Title picture: Abigail Karas.

Remembering Viktor Tsoi: Soviet Rock Heritage and the Politics of Commemoration in the Post-Soviet Space

Alexandra Kolesnik writes about Viktor Tsoi – leader of the legendary Soviet rock band Kino – and what the multiple memorial walls, monuments and other sites which commemorate him tell us today about Soviet rock heritage.

Who owns Soviet rock heritage? More than three decades after Viktor Tsoi’s death, memorial walls, monuments, and commemorative sites across the post-Soviet space reveal how cultural heritage is continually created, contested, and reinterpreted through struggles over memory, identity, and political belonging.

Wem gehört das Erbe des sowjetischen Rock? Mehr als drei Jahrzehnte nach Viktor Tsois Tod zeigen Gedenkmauern, Denkmäler und Erinnerungsorte im gesamten postsowjetischen Raum, wie kulturelles Erbe durch Auseinandersetzungen um Erinnerung, Identität und politische Zugehörigkeit ständig neu geschaffen, umkämpft und neu interpretiert wird.


In the post-Soviet space, the legacy of Soviet rock music has become increasingly visible – and increasingly contested. Walls covered in graffiti, memorial plaques, monuments, guided tours, exhibitions, and fan gatherings have transformed musicians of the late Soviet era into objects of cultural heritage. Yet these commemorative practices are more than nostalgia. They have become sites where questions of memory, identity, and political belonging are actively negotiated.

The case of Viktor Tsoi – leader of the legendary Soviet rock band Kino – offers a particularly revealing lens through which to examine these dynamics. Since Tsoi’s death in 1990, fans have created a remarkable transnational network of memorial sites stretching across Belarus, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Russia, and Ukraine. More than three decades later, these sites continue to attract visitors and generate new meanings. At the same time, they have become focal points for debates about the place of Soviet cultural heritage in societies that are increasingly divided by competing memory regimes, geopolitical conflicts, and processes of decolonization.

In heritage studies, scholars understand heritage not as a fixed collection of valuable objects but as a process through which societies decide what should be remembered, preserved, and publicly displayed. Heritage is therefore always political. It raises questions of authority, participation, and ownership: Who has the right to define cultural value? Which pasts deserve preservation? And who controls public memory? The commemorative practices surrounding Viktor Tsoi demonstrate that these questions remain particularly contentious when the past in question is both shared and politically contested.

From Soviet Rock to Cultural Heritage

Soviet rock emerged during the 1970s and 1980s within a semi-legal cultural environment shaped by censorship, informal recording networks, and institutions such as rock clubs. In cities like Leningrad (later St. Petersburg), Moscow, and Sverdlovsk (later Ekaterinburg), it developed through dense networks of musicians, organizers, journalists, and fans. By the late 1980s, musicians such as Viktor Tsoi had become cultural icons. Songs like Peremen (“Changes”) and Gruppa krovi (“Blood Type”) captured the atmosphere of late Soviet transformation and quickly acquired political and generational significance.

Viktor Tsoi, 1986 (public domain).

Tsoi’s sudden death in a car accident near Jūrmala in August 1990 at the age of 28 triggered an immediate wave of public mourning. Fans created spontaneous memorials across the Soviet Union: walls covered in inscriptions, informal shrines, commemorative gatherings, and anniversary rituals. These practices emerged at precisely the moment when the Soviet state itself was collapsing. As a result, Tsoi memorials became associated not only with musical memory but also with experiences of political rupture and transition. Over time, however, these vernacular forms of remembrance gradually attracted the attention of municipal authorities, cultural institutions, and tourism industries. This transition from informal memory to institutionalized heritage has generated numerous conflicts, particularly around questions of control and ownership.

Moscow: The Tsoi Wall as a Site of Conflict

The most famous example is the Tsoi Wall on Moscow’s Arbat Street. Covered in graffiti, drawings, signatures, and offerings, it remains an active place of gathering and commemoration. The wall’s openness is central to its significance. Visitors are expected to participate materially by adding inscriptions or interacting with existing ones. Yet this openness also makes the site vulnerable to intervention.

Tsoi Wall in Moscow, June 2018 (photo by the author). Since 1990, the Tsoi Wall in Moscow has functioned as one of the best-known vernacular memorials in the post-Soviet space.

Over the past two decades, the wall has repeatedly become the object of conflicts between fans, city authorities, artists, and political groups. In 2009, Moscow authorities proposed “restoring” the wall as part of a reconstruction project on Arbat Street. The plan would have replaced much of its vernacular character with a more controlled memorial format, prompting protests from fans and local residents.

The wall has also acquired political significance beyond music itself. Since the 2010s, Peremen has become closely associated with protest cultures in Russia, while the wall’s central location has transformed it into a visible platform for oppositional expression. However, more recently, Tsoi’s image has been incorporated into official patriotic narratives. State-supported exhibitions and new monuments increasingly present him as part of Russia’s national cultural canon.

At the same time, the Tsoi Wall continues to resist full institutional institutionalisation. In 2025, municipal workers again attempted to “restore” the site by replacing much of the graffiti with an official portrait of Tsoi. Fans immediately repainted the wall. This recurring cycle of erasure and re-inscription demonstrates that the wall functions not as a static monument but as an ongoing process of material participation.

Tsoi Wall in Moscow, March 2026 (published with kind permission of the author’s colleague).

Belarus: Protest, Risk, and Urban Space

In Belarus, Tsoi memorials have become deeply intertwined with political protest. The Tsoi Wall in Minsk, established shortly after the musician’s death, has repeatedly been monitored, restricted, or partially dismantled by authorities.

The political significance of Tsoi’s legacy intensified during the “silent protests” of 2011 and especially during the protests of 2020–2021. During these events, Peremen functioned as an unofficial protest anthem. It was played from mobile phones, car speakers, and apartment windows during demonstrations. Since then, the Tsoi Wall has remained an important spot for fans, but it is under camera surveillance.

Tsoi Wall in Minsk, March 2025 (photo by the author).

One of the most famous protest locations became the so-called “Square of Change” in Minsk – a residential courtyard named after Tsoi’s song. Decorated with murals and protest symbols, the courtyard hosted concerts, discussions, and acts of collective solidarity.

Soviet rock heritage thus became both an infrastructure of protest and an infrastructure of risk. Walls, courtyards, songs, and gathering places enabled political communication and collective identity, while simultaneously attracting increased state surveillance and persecution. Authorities treated these sites not merely as cultural objects but as politically dangerous spaces.

Kazakhstan and Latvia: Between Heritage and Belonging

Kazakhstan and Latvia highlight another important dimension of Soviet rock heritage: the place of Russian-language popular music in societies that are actively redefining their relationships with the Soviet past. Unlike Russia and Belarus, where Tsoi’s memory is closely intertwined with contemporary political conflicts, these cases raise broader questions about cultural ownership, linguistic heritage, and belonging. They demonstrate that Soviet rock cannot be understood simply as “Russian culture.” Instead, it occupies an ambiguous position between national, Soviet, and transnational forms of cultural memory.

In Kazakhstan, the commemoration of Viktor Tsoi has largely taken the form of institutionalized memorialization. In 2018, a monument to Tsoi was unveiled in Almaty at the site where scenes from Rashid Nugmanov’s film Igla (The Needle; 1988), starring Tsoi, were filmed. The monument has become a place of pilgrimage where visitors leave flowers, sing songs, and gather on anniversaries. Yet its significance extends beyond the memory of a single musician. Tsoi occupies a distinctive position within Kazakhstan’s cultural landscape: he is remembered simultaneously as a Soviet rock icon, a figure connected to the history of Kazakh cinema, and a symbol of a shared cultural space that transcends contemporary national borders.

Tsoi monument in Almaty, July 2024 (published with kind permission of the author’s colleague).

A different dynamic can be observed in Latvia. Here, the central commemorative site is the monument near Jūrmala marking the location of Tsoi’s fatal car accident. Unlike highly visible urban memorials, this roadside monument has largely been maintained through transnational fan initiatives rather than state institutions. Fans from Latvia, Estonia, and other post-Soviet countries continue to visit the site, organize commemorative events, and participate in restoration projects. The Latvian case foregrounds a less spectacular but no less political dimension of heritage conflict: not open confrontation over symbolic meaning, but ongoing struggles over who is willing and able to care for material traces of a contested past.

Tsoi monument in Talsi, March 2026 (photo by the author).

Ukraine and the Politics of Translation

Ukraine presents perhaps the most complex case. During the Euromaidan protests in 2013, Peremen was widely performed both in Russian and in Ukrainian translation. At the same time, the political context after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 has profoundly transformed perceptions of Soviet and Russian-language cultural symbols.

Memorials associated with Tsoi still exist in cities such as Kyiv, Dnipro, Kharkiv, and Odessa, but they have become sensitive sites. In Kyiv, the so-called “Tsoi Tree,” associated with the filming of a 1980s movie featuring Tsoi, was officially protected as a natural monument in 2020. Yet after 2022, commemorative plaques were removed, and gatherings around the site became more politically contentious.

Tsoi tree, Kyiv, September 2020, photo: AnatolyPm, Creative Commons.

Heritage as Materialized Conflict

The story of Soviet rock heritage demonstrates that the value of the past is never fixed. It emerges through ongoing struggles over memory, participation, and ownership. Walls, monuments, songs, and memorial sites become meaningful not because they preserve an uncontested past, but because different actors continually invest them with new interpretations and political significance.

The case of Viktor Tsoi reveals how a shared Soviet cultural legacy continues to circulate across national borders even as those borders become extremely politically charged. More than three decades after his death, the conflicts surrounding Tsoi’s memorials remind us that heritage is not simply inherited from the past. It is continually made, contested, and remade in the present.


Literature

Basik, S. (2023). “Vernacular Place Name as a Cultural Arena of Urban Place-Making and Symbolic Resistance in Minsk, Belarus,” Urban Geography, 44(8), 1825–1832.

Bennett, A., & Janssen, S. (eds.) (2019). Popular Music, Cultural Memory, and Heritage. London: Routledge.

Brandellero, A., & Janssen, S. (2014). “Popular Music as Cultural Heritage: Scoping Out the Field of Practice.” International Journal of Heritage Studies, 20(3), 224–240.

Cushman, T. (1995). Notes from Underground: Rock Music Counterculture in Russia. Albany: SUNY Press.

Hansen, A., Rogatchevski, A., Steinholt, Y., Wickström D.-E. (2019) A War of Songs: Popular Music and Recent Russia-Ukraine Relations. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.

Robertson, I. (ed.) (2016). Heritage from Below. London: Routledge.

Smith, L. (2006). Uses of Heritage. London: Routledge.

Zaporozhets, O., & Kolesnik, A. (2020). “Music Geography in Russia: Non-Auratic Places and Institutionalization ‘in Becoming’,” Journal of Cultural Geography, 37(1), 1–25.


Title picture: Tsoi Wall in Moscow with a mosaic of Tsoi, June 2017 (photo by the author).

Erbe ohne Erinnerungsort: Baracken im Nationalsozialismus

Jannik Noeske geht Ursprung und Erbe der typischen Holzbaracken auf die Spur, wie sie insbesondere in Konzentrationslagern errichtet wurden.

Einfache Holzbaracken wurden im Nationalsozialismus in großer Stückzahl hergestellt. Entworfen wurden sie in der sächsischen Kleinstadt Niesky – und dann in ganz Europa produziert. Dieses Erbe ist heute weitgehend in Vergessenheit geraten. Knappe Kassen und die politische Lage erschweren die Situation zusätzlich.

Simple wooden barracks were mass-produced under National Socialism. Designed in the small Saxon town of Niesky, they were then built across Europe. Today this heritage has largely fallen into oblivion — made worse by austerity scarce funding and a difficult political climate.


Ein unscheinbares Ausstellungsobjekt wird sie gewesen sein, die Holzbaracke auf der Sonderausstellung »Landeskultur und Arbeitsbeschaffung« auf der 39. Landwirtschaftsausstellung, die Ende Mai 1933 auf dem Berliner Messegelände abgehalten wurde. Kaum einer konnte ahnen, dass keine zehn Jahre später fast exakt dieser Bautyp in hunderttausendfacher Kopie in großen Teilen Europas her- und aufgestellt werden würde. Bei der Ausstellung der Deutschen Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft (DLG) war das Gebäude Teil einer Freiluft-Ausstellung zur Bodenmelioration, wie sie häufig durch den späteren Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) ausgeführt wurde. Damit versprach die Baracke als Ausstellungsobjekt Arbeit, Brot und Boden. Sie stand sinnbildlich für Themen, die früh von der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung vereinnahmt und zur Mobilisierung großer Teile der deutschen Bevölkerung genutzt werden konnten. Über 300.000 Menschen besuchten die Schau.

Die DLG-Ausstellung 1933 in Berlin. Quelle: Zeitschrift »Deutscher Arbeitsdienst« 10/1933, S. 200.

Ein Freiwilliger Arbeitsdienst als Versuch der Arbeitsbeschaffung bestand zu diesem Zeitpunkt schon seit einigen Jahren, war aber bis 1933 wenig erfolgreich geblieben. Rasch entwickelte er sich nach 1933 zu einem wichtigen Propagandaprojekt der NSDAP. Die Aussicht, eine desillusionierte Generation aus der Krisenerfahrung von 1929/30 herausführen zu können, fruchtete bald.

Für das Versprechen von Binnenkolonisation und »Brot aus deutscher Scholle« war es wichtig, die einzelnen Arbeitsdienst-Abteilungen räumlich flexibel einsetzen zu können. So setzte sich der verantwortliche Ingenieur bei der Reichsleitung des Arbeitsdienstes, Alfred Künzel, schon früh dafür ein, große Holzbaukonzerne für ein solches Großprojekt gewinnen zu können. Die Baracke der DLG-Ausstellung wurde durch Christoph & Unmack aufgestellt, ein schon damals bedeutendes Unternehmen im Holzbau. Schon seit dem 19. Jahrhundert entwickelte man dort transportable, zerlegbare Holzbaracken. Diese dienten den Bedürfnissen des Militärs, des Krankenwesens und wurden auch in Kolonien verwendet, etwa bei Expeditionen oder beim Eisenbahnbau.

RAD-Baracke Typ RL IV/3, Typenblatt von 1936. Quelle: Konrad-Wachsmann-Haus Niesky.

Bis 1935 wurden Arbeitsdienstabteilungen im gesamten Deutschen Reich aufgestellt, so dass eine allgemeine Dienstpflicht zunächst für junge Männer eingeführt werden konnte. Dies war nicht nur für Christoph & Unmack ein einträgliches Geschäft. Fast alle neuen Arbeitsdienstlager wurden mithilfe der von C&U entwickelten RAD-Baracken aufgebaut. Auch etwa die Reichsautobahnlager bauten auf diesem Typ auf. Schon 1936 und 1937 wurden diese Holzbauten aber auch beim Aufbau der SS-Konzentrationslager in Sachsenhausen, Buchenwald und bei der Erweiterung des Lagers in Dachau verwendet. 1938 folgten die Lager zur Errichtung des sogenannten Westwalls und ab 1939 war es die Wehrmacht, die große Aufträge vergab.

Produktion in ganz Europa

Schon länger reichten die Einschläge in deutschen Forsten nicht aus, um die Bedürfnisse an Bauholz sicherzustellen, die die nationalsozialistische Industriepolitik im Zuge der Kriegsvorbereitung hervorgebracht hatte. Daran konnte auch eine Erhöhung der Einschlagquoten nichts ändern. Erst der Zugriff auf Waldgebiete der besetzten und verbündeten Staaten ab 1939 erlaubte die enorme Steigerung der Barackenproduktion. Noch im ersten Kriegsjahr wurden Abkommen zur Lieferung von Holzbauten mit der schwedischen und finnischen Holzindustrie abgeschlossen. Auch ein Schweizer Holzbausyndikat schloss einen Vertrag mit der SS.

Zwei Beispiele aus Südosteuropa illustrieren diese internationale Dimension, die zwischen Kollaboration, verbrecherischer Ausbeutung und nachhaltig wirksamen Investitionen oszilliert. In den waldreichen Gebieten im Südosten Europas war es deutsches Kapital, das die dortige Forstindustrie für die Bedürfnisse der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft ertüchtigte. Im 1939 gegründeten Slowakischen Staat – mit einer faschistischen, von NS-Deutschland abhängigen Regierung – investierte der Hamburger Reemtsma-Konzern in die Fließbandfertigung von Baracken in Turany. Der Forstwissenschaftler Johann Albrecht von Monroy hatte die Idee aus den Vereinigten Staaten mitgebracht: eine Barackenfabrik direkt im Wald. Dort wurde das in der Umgebung hergestellte Rundholz direkt zu RAD-Baracken weiterverarbeitet. Im ersten Jahr produzierte das Werk schon über 1000 Baracken und steigerte bis 1944 seine Kapazität auf täglich 7,5 Baracken.

Verfallende Fabrikbauten in Turany (Slowakei) erzählen von der Industriepolitik der Nazis in der Slowakei während des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Eigenes Foto, März 2026.

In Zavidovići in Bosnien, das nach dem Überfall auf die Balkanregion dem neuen, ebenfalls mit NS-Deutschland verbündeten Unabhängigen Staat Kroatien angehörte, war es die Firma HOBAG aus Breslau (heute Wrocław), die sich auf Kosten der dortigen Waldbestände und gegen den Widerstand lokaler Partisanengruppen an der deutschen Kriegsführung bereicherte. Ab dem Sommer 1941 bis Ende 1942 liefen hier bereits 846 Baracken vom Band. Die HOBAG unterhielt auch Barackenwerke in Galizien, wo sie systematisch KZ-Gefangene für die Arbeit in den Holzwerken ausbeutete. Dort fanden viele von ihnen bei der Arbeit den Tod.

Die SS orderte Gefängnisbaracken in Zavidovići (Bosnien), hier für ein Lager in Bromberg (heute Bydgoszcz), beim HOBAG-Werk in Zavidovići in Bosnien. Quelle: Historisches Museum Sarajevo.

Barackenentwürfe aus Niesky

Schon seit 1933 waren die Baracken nach Nieskyer Entwürfen durch ein ganzes Netzwerk an Betrieben hergestellt worden. Es reichte, die Pläne über die RAD-Verwaltung als sogenannte Typenblätter anzufordern. Um die weitere Rationalisierung der Barackenproduktion zu gewährleisten, formalisierte der Reichsarbeitsdienst die Kooperation mit Christoph & Unmack. So wollte die Reichsleitung des RAD die Zusammenarbeit verbessern und weitere Barackentypen ins Programm aufnehmen. 1939 wurde aus diesem Konstruktionsbüro die »Forschungs- und Konstruktionsgemeinschaft der Reichsleitung des Arbeitsdienstes und der Deutschen Holzbaukonvention«, kurz: FOKORAD.

Das FOKORAD-Gebäude in Niesky. Bild: Konrad-Wachsmannhaus Niesky.

Über die Arbeitsweise des Büros ist wenig bekannt. Hinweise ergeben sich aber durch das Bürogebäude, das die FOKORAD nutzte und das bis heute existiert. Wahrscheinlich ist, dass ehemalige Kriegsgefangenbaracken aus dem Ersten Weltkrieg in der Neuhofer Straße in Niesky schon zuvor als Sitz gedient hatten. 1940 wurden sie aber umfassend um- und neugebaut. Der als eingeschossige Bau aus Holz-Fertigteilen entworfene FOKORAD-Sitz beherbergte nur einige Zeichentische, eine kleine Anzahl von Verwaltungs- und Funktionsräumen sowie einen Schulungsraum. In den letzten Kriegstagen floh die FOKORAD nach Hermsdorf in Thüringen, das Gebäude selbst wurde geplündert. Schon bald wurde es aber durch Volkseigene Betriebe wieder genutzt und überstand dadurch die Zeit. Erst zuletzt wurde seine seit 1940 kontinuierliche Nutzungsgeschichte durch ein Insolvenzverfahren unterbrochen.

Kein Erinnerungsort

In KZ-Gedenkstätten sind die Baracken musealisiert, teilweise aber auf Kosten der historischen Authentizität. Nicht überall ist zudem ihr Bestand gesichert. Im ehemaligen Kriegsgefangenenlager Sandbostel werden sie einem »kontrollierten Verfall« überlassen. Andernorts sind es nur lokale, ehrenamtliche Initiativen, die sich für den Erhalt einsetzen, wie etwa die alte RAD-Truppführerschule in Coesfeld-Lette bei Münster, die nach 1945 zur Unterbringung von Displaced Persons und Flüchtlingen und von 1960 bis 1998 durch den Katastrophenschutz des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen genutzt wurde. Der Komplex stellt eins der wenigen als geschlossene Anlage überlieferten Lager dar. Zwar sind mittlerweile auch einige Einzelbaracken als Kulturdenkmale gelistet, viele verschwinden aber weiterhin. Auch das FOKORAD-Gebäude in Niesky selbst muss als zumindest bedroht wahrgenommen werden – was sich vor allem aus der dort herrschenden lokalpolitischen Situation ergibt.

Von den zahlreichen einfachen, standardisierten Holzbauten aus der NS-Zeit ist kaum etwas Materielles geblieben. Mit Ausnahme einiger »kanonisierter« und aufwendig wiederhergestellter Baracken – insbesondere in KZ-Gedenkstätten – entziehen sich die Gebäude unserem Bild von NS-Architektur. Im Gegensatz zu ausgeprägten Erinnerungsorten wie dem Nürnberger Reichsparteitagsgelände oder dem sogenannten Gauforum in Weimar haben sie also keinen Ort in der Geschichte, wenngleich sie uns viel über den Nationalsozialismus erzählen: Was als Versprechen in Form von Arbeit, Brot und Boden begann, endete in Arbeitszwang, Folter und Vernichtung. 1933 war noch nicht alles entschieden, aber das Regime profitierte später von der durch die FOKORAD-Ingenieure am Zeichentisch geleisteten Vorarbeit. Die Barackenproduktion erzählt außerdem von der verbrecherischen Ausbeutung durch die deutsche Besatzungsmacht, vor allem in Ost- und Südosteuropa. Das Thema ist darüber hinaus reich an Bezügen zu gegenwärtigen Fragen – Fragen nach Erinnerungspolitik genauso wie zu einer auf den scheinbar nachhaltigen Baustoff Holz und Standardisierung setzende Architekturproduktion.

Das FOKORAD-Gebäude könnte also ein Erinnerungs- und Debattenort sein – muss aber von einer engagierten Öffentlichkeit als solcher anerkannt, entwickelt und gesichert werden. Ob das aber angesichts des zunehmenden Rechtsrucks, knapper öffentlicher Kassen und einem mangelnden Bewusstsein für das industrielle Erbe überhaupt möglich ist, kann aktuell nicht mit Sicherheit gesagt werden.


Literaturhinweise

Robert Jan van Pelt: The Barrack 1572–1914. Chapters in the History of Emergency Architecture. Zürich: Park Books 2024.

Jan Bergmann-Ahlswede/Iris Engelmann/Jacob Gabriel/Jannik Noeske/Kai Wenzel: Ein mehrfach unbequemes Erbe: Das FOKORAD-Gebäude in Niesky, in: Die Denkmalpflege 84 (2026), https://doi.org/10.1515/dkp-2026-1006.


Titelbild: Zavidovići (Bosnien), ca. 1943. Ein Barackenlager, bestehend aus Holzbaracken des Typs RLM 501 befand sich am Rand des Dorfes. Quelle: Stadtbibliothek Zavidovići.

What Algorithms Find in Latvian Exile Newspapers: Songs, Maps, and the Paradoxes of Digital Reading

Simon Donig, Dinara Gagarina and Timur Mitrofanov use computational analysis to gain new insights into how Latvian diaspora newspapers preserved cultural identity.

Topic modeling reveals how Latvian diaspora newspapers preserved cultural identity from the 1940s to 2000s. Our computational analysis of over 7,000 articles uncovers song festivals, Cold War geographies, and unexpected methodological lessons for digital humanities.

Topic Modeling zeigt, wie lettische Diaspora-Zeitungen von den 1940er bis 2000er Jahren kulturelle Identität bewahrten. Unsere computergestützte Analyse von über 7.000 Artikeln enthüllt Liederfeste, Geografien des Kalten Krieges und unerwartete methodische Erkenntnisse für die Digital Humanities.


How to read thousands of newspaper articles?

This was the question we faced when the National Library of Latvia granted us access to their digitized collection of Latvian exile press – 27 newspapers and journals, over 17,000 issues, and more than 780,000 articles published by diaspora communities from Australia to Canada between the 1940s and 2000s (this analysis represents a pilot study focused on English-language materials – roughly 7,000 relevant articles categorized via the Python langdetect library with a confidence level exceeding 70%). Traditional close reading would take ages. Instead, we turned to topic modeling – and specifically BERTopic – to discover what these communities wrote about and how they preserved their identity far from home.


Čikāgas Ziņas, Issue No. 25, May 1978

What Is Topic Modeling?

Topic modeling is a computational method that identifies recurring themes across large text collections. Imagine sorting thousands of documents into thematic folders. To achieve this, instead of you reading each one, an algorithm detects patterns of words that frequently appear together. A cluster containing election, vote, parliament, and party likely represents political coverage; one with church, pastor, congregation, and prayer points to religious life.

Traditional approaches like LDA (Latent Dirichlet Allocation) have been used in digital humanities for over a decade, but often produce topics that are difficult to interpret. BERTopic, a newer technique, leverages transformer-based language models – the same technology behind ChatGPT – to better capture semantic meaning (for an accessible overview of available tools, see Egger & Yu, 2022). It understands that song festival is a single concept, not just two unrelated words. This makes it particularly suited for analysing historical newspapers, where cultural terms and multi-word expressions carry significant meaning.

The results surprised us – not because the algorithm found something entirely unexpected, but because it independently confirmed what historians have known about Baltic diaspora culture, while also revealing patterns we hadn’t anticipated.


Most popular topics (fragment of BERTopic visualization for 1-2-3-gram approach): Culture (Topic 1), Labor Camps (Topic 2), Science and Education (Topic 3), etc. Topic 0 is the largest cluster by document count, aggregating heterogeneous texts that do not fit into specialized clusters. Duplicate singular/plural forms in some topics (e.g., “law”/”citizenship law”) reflect intentionally minimal lemmatization, applied to pre-serve culturally specific vocabulary.

When the Algorithm Rediscovers Song Festivals

The largest thematic cluster in our English-language corpus – more than 200 out of 7,000 articles – centers on music, festivals, songs, opera, concerts, folk traditions, choirs, and dance. For anyone familiar with Baltic culture, this is no surprise. The Latvian Song and Dance Festival, a tradition dating back to 1873, has been a cornerstone of national identity. UNESCO recognized it as a Masterpiece of Oral and Intangible Heritage. But seeing the algorithm arrive at this conclusion independently, purely through statistical patterns in word co-occurrence, was a moment of validation.


Latvia. Riga. VII Latvian Song Festival. 1931. Photographer: unknown. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

When we refined our analysis from single words (unigrams) to three-word phrases (trigrams), the picture sharpened dramatically. Generic terms like “music” and “festival” became “Latvian song festival,” “Latvian community center,” and “Chicago Latvian community.” The exile press wasn’t just discussing music in the abstract – it was documenting specific community gatherings, venues, and cultural institutions that kept traditions alive thousands of miles from Riga.

Other major themes emerged with similar clarity each in its own temporal horizon within the corpus: forced labor camps and Soviet deportations, universities and academic life in exile, NATO membership of host countries and geopolitical advocacy, and church activities. These clusters tell a story of how displaced persons and communities maintained not just cultural practices, but also historical memory, educational institutions, and political engagement.

The Geography of Diaspora Memory

Beyond thematic analysis, we extracted nearly 40,000 geographic place mentions from the corpus. The spatial distribution of exile communities, it turns out, organized itself along three dimensions.

First, the lost homeland: Riga dominates with over 4,000 mentions, later followed by other Latvian cities and regions. The homeland remained central to diaspora consciousness even decades after displacement.

Second, the political adversary: Moscow appears over 2,460 times – more than any city except Riga. The Soviet capital was a constant reference point, whether in discussions of occupation, Cold War politics, or eventual independence movements.

Third, the new homes: the United States leads with mentions of Chicago, Washington, New York, and other cities totaling over 3,000 references. Australia follows (Sydney, Melbourne), then Canada (Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa). These weren’t just places where Latvians happened to live – they were sites of community building, cultural preservation, and political organizing.

What surprised us were the unexpected geographic references. Korea (both) with 621 mentions, Hungary 276, Afghanistan 241 – hot spots of Cold War confrontation. The exile press, it seems, was not merely nostalgic. It engaged actively with global politics, tracking conflicts that resonated with both their experience of Soviet occupation and the Cold War concerns of their host countries.

The Paradox of Perfect Scores

Such metrical results always carry the grain of aggregated errors. This is why digital historians control their results with various metrics. Here we must be honest about a methodological discovery that gave us pause. When we evaluated our topic models using standard coherence metrics – statistical measures of how well topic words hang together semantically, essentially asking „do these words make sense as a group?” – the highest-scoring results came from our bigram model. Good news, we thought initially.

But when we examined what these “coherent” topics actually contained, we found telephone directories, professional listings, and contact information. The algorithm had identified patterns that were indeed highly structured and internally consistent – but not the kind of information we were looking for – it identified a category of text or genre rather than for instance meaning-making.

This is a crucial lesson for computational humanities: statistical validity does not equal historical relevance. A topic capturing “Grand Rapids Mich,” “Silver Spring MD,” and “Los Angeles CA” might score perfectly on coherence metrics because these phrases always appear in the same structured format. These directory-style topics – assuming they represent address and subscription tables – reveal a lot about which exile locations were on the radar of the diaspora community. They could be used to map the geography of dispersal or reconstruct community networks. The lesson is that topic modeling is a serendipitous technology. It holds a lot of answers, if you know how to ask the right questions in relation to the algorithmic technology and the corpus.

The solution to tracing the meaning-making in the communities was combining multiple approaches. Our unigram model provided broad thematic categories with strong coherence. The trigram model captured specific cultural phrases despite lower overall scores. Together, they offered complementary perspectives that neither could provide alone (Burckhardt et al. 2019).

What Comes Next

This analysis represents a pilot study focused on English-language materials – roughly 7,000 articles from a much larger multilingual collection. The full corpus also includes Latvian, Russian, German, and Swedish texts spanning 27 periodicals and over 780,000 articles.

Our next steps involve extending the analysis to the complete multilingual archive using a multilingual transformer model such as multilingual-e5-large, comparing how identity themes manifest across languages, – specifically, how references to the homeland shifted around key political events like the 1990-1991 restoration of independence.

More broadly, we see potential for deeper temporal analysis – how was Latvian culture represented in the 1950s compared to the late 1980s? From there, we plan a comparative analysis across other exile press collections from the former Soviet space. Did Estonian, Lithuanian or Ukrainian diaspora newspapers show similar patterns of cultural preservation? The methods we developed for the Latvian corpus could be adapted for cross-cultural comparison.

The exile press represents a remarkable archive of how displaced communities maintained identity across decades and continents. Computational methods cannot replace careful historical interpretation, and they need rigid methodological and epistemological grounding – our experience with misleadingly high coherence scores illustrates that. When applied carefully, however, they can reveal patterns across thousands of documents that no individual scholar could read in a lifetime – not merely confirming what we already suspect, but generating new hypotheses and unexpected connections that would otherwise remain invisible.


References

Egger R and Yu J (2022) A Topic Modeling Comparison Between LDA, NMF, Top2Vec, and BERTopic to Demystify Twitter Posts. In: Frontiers in Sociology. Volume 7, 2022. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2022.886498

Burckhardt, Daniel, Alexander Geyken, Achim Saupe, und Thomas Werneke. Distant Reading in der Zeitgeschichte. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer computergestützten Historischen Semantik am Beispiel der DDR-Presse. 2019. https://doi.org/10.14765/ZZF.DOK-1345.


Title picture: European Latvian Song Festival, 1973, Cologne, Germany; from the private collection of Ilze Šakare; National Library of Latvia. Published here with kind permission of the copyright owner.

Koloniales Erbe und „Postkoloniale Angst“: Zum Stand der kolonialen Aufarbeitung vor Ort

Kim Todzi schreibt über die Aufarbeitung des kolonialen Erbes in Hamburg.

Die Aufarbeitung des kolonialen Erbes in Deutschland bleibt umkämpft: Trotz wichtiger Fortschritte erleben viele Initiativen zunehmende Gegenwehr. Kulturkämpfe, fehlende Institutionalisierung und prekäre Strukturen gefährden die bisherigen Erfolge und stellen die Erinnerungskultur vor neue Herausforderungen.

The reappraisal of Germany’s colonial heritage remains a contentious issue: despite significant progress, many initiatives are facing increasing resistance. Cultural conflicts, a lack of institutionalisation and precarious structures are jeopardising the successes achieved so far and posing new challenges for the commemorative culture.


Die aktuelle Diskussion um das neue Gedenkstättenkonzept der Bundesregierung macht deutlich, wie brüchig die bisherigen Fortschritte der kolonialen Aufarbeitung sind. Während in den vergangenen Jahren an zahlreichen Orten Initiativen entstanden sind, die koloniale Spuren in ihrer direkten Umgebung untersuchen, sichtbar machen und damit die lokale Erinnerungskultur verändern, wächst zugleich der Widerstand gegen die Aufarbeitung der Kolonialgeschichte. Ein aktuelles Beispiel dafür ist die Entscheidung von Kulturstaatsminister Wolfram Weimer, den Kolonialismus vollständig aus dem Gedenkstättenkonzept zu streichen, obwohl seine Vorgängerin Claudia Roth ihn ausdrücklich aufgenommen sehen wollte.

“Umbenennungsfest Mohrenstraße, Berlin, 18. August 2018.” Foto: Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.

In zahlreichen Städten, Gemeinden und Regionen Deutschlands hatte in den vergangenen zehn Jahren eine intensive Auseinandersetzung mit dem materiellen und immateriellen Erbe des Kolonialismus begonnen. Postkoloniale Initiativen, Communities, Geschichtswerkstätten und Wissenschaftler:innen forderten immer vehementer eine Aufarbeitung des kolonialen Erbes. Und es begann allmählich Früchte zu tragen: Hamburg bekannte sich als erstes Bundesland bereits 2014 zur eigenen kolonialen Vergangenheit, verkündete einen „Neustart“ in der postkolonialen Erinnerungskultur, gründete 2015 die Forschungsstelle „Hamburgs (post-)koloniales Erbe“ und versprach ein stadtweites Erinnerungskonzept. Berlin richtete 2020 eine Koordinierungsstelle für Dekolonisierung ein, und Thüringen gründete 2021 die Koordinationsstelle „Koloniales Erbe“. Die Stadt Hannover begann 2023 einen Prozess zur Erarbeitung eines postkolonialen Erinnerungskonzeptes. Das Bekenntnis zur Aufarbeitung und Verantwortung für die Kolonialgeschichte fand sich zudem seit 2017 in den Koalitionsverträgen der deutschen Bundesregierungen. Neben der Erinnerung an den Nationalsozialismus und das DDR-Unrecht sollte die Auseinandersetzung mit der Kolonialgeschichte als dritte Säule das Grundverständnis der bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerungskultur prägen. Ihren Höhepunkt erreichte die gesellschaftliche Aufmerksamkeit 2020, als infolge der Black-Lives-Matter-Proteste allerorten auf Spuren der kolonialen Vergangenheit und den oftmals unkritischen Umgang damit hingewiesen und dagegen protestiert wurde.

Zugleich gibt es in den vergangenen Jahren stärkeren Gegenwind. Nicht nur in Großbritannien formieren sich reaktionäre Kräfte unter dem Banner „History Reclaimed“, auch in Deutschland haben konservative und rechte Medien und Parteien den Kolonialismus bzw. die Debatte um dessen Aufarbeitung als wichtiges erinnerungs- und identitätspolitisches Feld entdeckt und bearbeiten es intensiv. Hinzu kommt eine neue, breite Skepsis gegenüber allem, was auch nur den Anschein von „Postkolonialismus“ oder „Dekolonisierung“ im Namen trägt. Diese Entwicklung begann in Deutschland 2020 mit der Diskussion um die Ausladung des kamerunischen Historikers Achille Mbembe von der Ruhrtriennale und erreichte infolge der Attacke der Hamas auf Israel am 7. Oktober einen neuen Höhepunkt. Seitdem wird postkolonialen Ansätzen häufig vorgeworfen, den israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt einseitig in kolonialen Analogien zu deuten und damit antisemitische Muster zu verstärken. Die Folge: mehr Aufmerksamkeit für den Begriff „Postkolonialismus“ in den Medien, aber in negativem Kontext.

Das lässt sich quantitativ relativ einfach nachvollziehen. Bis 2020 wurden Begriffe im Zusammenhang mit Postkolonialismus, postkolonial etc. durchaus in den Medien erwähnt, doch eine Verdichtung der Nennungen ergab sich erst infolge der Black-Lives-Matter-Proteste einerseits und der Diskussion um Mbembes Ausladung und die Antisemitismusvorwürfe andererseits. Ihren absoluten Höhepunkt erreichte die negative Zuspitzung 2024.


DWDS-Verlaufskurve für „postkolonial“, erstellt durch das Digitale Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, abgerufen am 19.9.2025.

Diese diskursive Verbindung führte zwar zu vielen Zeitungsartikeln und Meinungsbeiträgen, zugleich aber auch zu einer massiven Verkürzung. Dies ist nicht nur der Medienlogik geschuldet, die durch Simplifizierungen dazu beigetragen hat, sondern auch Ergebnis einer gezielten politischen Kampagne. Nikita Dhawan schreibt in ihrem 2024 erschienenen Buch „Die Aufklärung vor Europa retten“, dass dieser Diskurs – unabhängig von seiner geografischen und historischen Ausprägung – von der globalen Rechten instrumentalisiert werde, um eine „postkoloniale Angst“ zu schüren. Der rechtsextreme Aktivist Christopher Rufo, der zuvor erfolgreich eine Kampagne gegen die Critical Race Theory in den USA angestoßen hatte, schrieb bereits im Oktober 2023 auf Twitter, dass Konservative Begriffe wie Hamas, Black Lives Matter und Dekolonisierung bewusst miteinander verknüpfen sollten. Ziel sei es, diese Begriffe zu delegitimieren und ihre Bedeutung im gesellschaftlichen Diskurs zu untergraben.

Insofern treffen Initiativen und Projekte, die sich mit dem kolonialen Erbe befassen, auf ein gesellschaftliches Klima, das die Beschäftigung und kritische Aufarbeitung des Kolonialismus zunehmend skeptisch betrachtet. Erste Anzeichen eines Rückschlags machen sich daher an vielen Orten bemerkbar. So stellte die Stadt Hamburg 2024 die Finanzierung der Forschungsstelle „Hamburgs (post-)koloniales Erbe“ ein, Koordinierungsstellen in Thüringen und Berlin bleiben befristet, und obwohl es etwa ein politisches Versprechen in Bremen gab, das Thema anzugehen, wurde die Aufarbeitung dort nie systematisch angegangen.

Die koloniale Aufarbeitung bleibt prekär. Ein Beispiel für aktuelle Konfliktlinien zwischen Stadtentwicklung und Erinnerungskultur bietet etwa der Baakenhafen in Hamburg: Dieses 1,4 Kilometer lange Hafenbecken war integraler Bestandteil der kolonialen Infrastruktur und ab 1904 die logistische Drehscheibe des Völkermords an den Herero und Nama im heutigen Namibia. Der Baakenhafen wird heute als familienfreundliches Wohnquartier vermarktet, ohne dass seine koloniale Geschichte im Stadtraum sichtbar wäre. Gemeinsam mit Jürgen Zimmerer habe ich daher im Mai 2024 Einspruch gegen die damaligen Bebauungspläne eingelegt und die Einrichtung eines Dokumentations- und Lernorts gefordert. Zusätzliche Brisanz erhält die Debatte um eine angemessene Erinnerung vor Ort durch das 2025 vorgestellte Projekt einer von Klaus-Michael Kühne gestifteten Oper am Baakenhöft, der westlichen Spitze des Baakenhafens. Die Gefahr liegt auf der Hand: Ohne verbindliche Strukturen und dauerhaft bestehende, materielle Orte des Gedenkens drohen städtebauliche Projekte historische Verantwortung zu überdecken.

Dabei zeigt sich das zentrale Problem der postkolonialen Aufarbeitung in Deutschland – im Großen wie im Kleinen: Fast alle Vorhaben zur Aufarbeitung wurden als Projekte mit einem zeitlichen Ablaufdatum konzipiert. Sie sind damit dem Wohl und Wehe gesellschaftlicher und politischer Konjunkturen unterworfen. Schickte es sich noch vor fünf Jahren, als Politiker eine sensible Rede zu halten und für ein Pressefoto mit Aktivist:innen zu posieren, gelten angesichts eines zunehmend regressiven Zeitgeistes aktuell andere Prioritäten. Gerade deshalb braucht es eine dauerhafte Institutionalisierung der kolonialen Aufarbeitung. Denn diese kann nur nachhaltig erfolgreich sein, wenn sie auf verlässlichen Strukturen aufbaut.

Auch deshalb wäre die Aufnahme des Kolonialismus in das Gedenkstättenkonzept des Bundes notwendig gewesen: Sie hätte erstmals die Möglichkeit eröffnet, eine entsprechende bundesweite Struktur aufzubauen und dem Thema jene institutionelle Stabilität zu geben, die bislang fehlt. Stattdessen wird die fehlende Institutionalisierung nun paradoxerweise selbst zum Argument gegen die Aufnahme. Dabei handelt es sich freilich weniger um einen sachlichen als um einen taktischen Einwand, denn der inhaltliche Grund, den Kulturstaatsminister Wolfram Weimer im Sommer 2025 anführte, die Aufnahme der Erinnerung an den Kolonialismus würde die Singularität des Holocaust relativieren, wäre höchstens unter Ausblendung des DDR-Unrechts nachvollziehbar. Durch das nun jedoch erneut beschlossene Nebeneinander von Erinnerung an den Nationalsozialismus und an das DDR-Unrecht bei gleichzeitiger Ausklammerung der Kolonialgeschichte bleibt das Gedenkstättenkonzept in sich widersprüchlich.

Eigentlich sollte allen Beteiligten klar sein: Historische Aufarbeitung ist ein langer, oftmals schmerzhafter Prozess. Sie bedeutet im Falle des Kolonialismus, sich der eigenen Gewaltgeschichte an geographisch weit entfernten Orten und den anhaltenden Auswirkungen kolonialer Kontinuitäten und des strukturellen Rassismus konsequent zu stellen. Die Fragen, wer erinnert wird, wie erinnert wird und wessen Erfahrungen Anerkennung finden, sind zentral für jede demokratische Gesellschaft, die Aufklärung und Gerechtigkeit ernst nimmt. Wie kann eine Geschichtskultur aussehen, die auch die Würde derjenigen anerkennt, deren Geschichte und Leid bisher marginalisiert oder ignoriert wurden? Im Kern geht es um das Recht der Kolonisierten und ihrer Nachfahren, dass ihre Perspektiven Teil der offiziellen Gedenkkultur der ehemaligen Kolonialmächte werden.

Die koloniale Aufarbeitung in Deutschland ist keine reine Erfolgs- und Fortschrittsgeschichte. Sie ist ein dialektischer Prozess innerhalb einer fragilen deutschen Erinnerungskultur, die lange als außergewöhnlich selbstkritisch galt und die nun beweisen muss, dass sie diesem Anspruch auch in den kommenden Jahren und verschiedenen Kontexten gerecht werden kann.


Titelbild: Bismarck-Denkmal in Hamburg-Altona. Es wurde im Zuge der Black-Lives-Matter Proteste mit roter Farbe beschmiert. Foto: Kim Todzi.

Beyond the Heroic Age of Antarctic Exploration: Navigating the Past at the Polar Museum

Mohammad Abu Al Hasan reflects on Antarctic legacies in the museum landscape.

How can museums effectively mediate the human history and heritage in Antarctica? Which curatorial strategies may help to bridge the vast geographical distance and foster public connection with the Antarctic continent?

Wie können Museen die Geschichte und das Kulturerbe der Antarktis wirkungsvoll vermitteln? Welche kuratorischen Strategien können dabei helfen, die enorme geografische Entfernung zu überbrücken und eine Verbindung der Öffentlichkeit zum antarktischen Kontinent herzustellen?


The Polar Museum of Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI), University of Cambridge.

As a recipient of the 2025 Cambridge-Leibniz Museum and Collection Fellowship, I arrived at the Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI) in the University of Cambridge. My main project at the German Maritime Museum (DSM) focuses on Protecting and Managing Antarctic Heritage, so my fellowship research investigates how these far-reaching heritages are communicated in the museum space.

From the moment I walked into the Polar Museum of SPRI’s main building, I understood this was no ordinary institution. The grand entrance hall’s wall bears the final, poignant words of Captain Robert Falcon Scott: ‘Had we lived, I should have had a tale… These rough notes and our dead bodies must tell the tale…’. This is a profound act of affective curatorship. It acts as an immediate narrative plunge, utilizing the limited space of the museum to immerse the visitor in the context even before they reach the exhibition. It centers the museum’s narrative on tragic heroism, priming the visitor for a story of awe and admiration.

The Entrance and the famous quotation of Scott during his last days, providing the ground of the storytelling of the museum.

The community of the Scott Polar Research Institute truly comes to life every day at 10:30 a.m., when the original bell from Scott’s 1910 Terra Nova expedition ship is rung for tea. This ritual became a vital part of my time here, allowing me to meet other scientists and share our research. My task as a fellow was to understand how this powerful, memorial-centric narrative in the museum shapes our public understanding of Antarctica, especially in an age of urgent climate change.

Encountering the ‘Final Camp’: The Power of an Affective Past

My first week was a deep immersion. I spent days observing the museum objects and their labels, often having long discussions with Laura and Florence, two very dedicated members of the museum, who were always ready to help and discuss the exhibits.

The visitor’s path leads into the main event after the Arctic Exhibitions: the Antarctic gallery, unambiguously titled ‘Antarctic Exploration – the Heroic Age’. The title itself narrows the continent’s vast history to one mythologized period. Inside, the hierarchy is clear: the major portion of the space is for Robert Falcon Scott. A secondary focus is on Ernest Shackleton and a minor role is for Roald Amundsen, who appears mainly as the champion in the race to the pole, but Scott tragically became the ‘Second’.

The exhibition is a masterclass in narrative tension. The Scott display builds to the heartbreaking discovery of Amundsen’s tent, captured by Scott’s own despairing words: ‘Great God! This is an awful place…’.

The Display of Scott’s expedition to the South Pole.

The story culminates in the most affectively charged section, ‘The Final Camp’. This showcase functions as a secular shrine, displaying the intimate relics of the deceased men: a journal wallet, prayer books, and, in some pull-out drawers, their original, handwritten farewell letters. Opening those drawers is a transformative, private, and profoundly emotional encounter. This is a powerful storytelling tool: tangible relics of great men shaping a powerful national story.

The Present on the Periphery: The ‘Ice and Climate’ Gallery

After this immersive journey, the path concludes in the third and final gallery: ‘Ice and Climate: Exploration into Science’. This final, smallest gallery is positioned as a coda or epilogue to the main performance, tucked away by the exit. The atmosphere shifts from the dramatic and affective to the modern and moralistic. Clean, white blocks and digital screens feel more like a contemporary science center, signaling a move from storytelling to information.

This section highlights a core challenge of curating our current era, the Anthropocene. The contemporary story of climate change is abstract and lacks the narrative power of Scott’s letters. So how does the museum lend its authority? It powers the authenticity and historical weight of its most prized collections. To explain the Ozone Hole, the museum displays a telescope from the 1901 Discovery expedition. This is a deliberate strategy to leverage the museum collection by linking the historic era scientific observation with the present crisis. The implication is that the Heroic era objects are called upon as witnesses. The exhibition uses historic tools to ground climate data in a tangible lineage of polar observation.

A View from Bremerhaven: A Tale of Two Polar Narratives

My time at Cambridge went beyond just observing the objects; it involved engaging in critical dialogues with the scholars about the politics of Antarctic Heritage preservation. A dedicated discussion with the curator, Dr. David Waterhouse, offered essential insights into collection strategies, while Dr. Bryan Lintott’s guidance through the institutional archives reshaped my perspective on Antarctic Heritage Politics. These exchanges were crucial for my own research focus on how the value of the distant Antarctic Historic Sites and Monuments (HSM) can be mediated to the museum space to raise awareness and bridge the gap between the public and preservation efforts on that barren Antarctic landscape.    

Being from DSM and observing the museum exhibits of the Polar Museum gave the opportunity to do comparative analysis, which reveals two very different modes of polar curatorship. Cambridge exemplifies the memorial approach, using the affective power of relics to narrate a story of heroic sacrifice.

The Display of Sheckleton.

The German Maritime Museum (DSM) in Bremerhaven, by contrast, pioneers an experiential-scientific approach. Free from a foundational ‘Heroic Age’ legacy, its new exhibition axes the narrative squarely onto contemporary polar science, featuring an installation modeled on the modern research vessel Polarstern and using interactive media to make polar research an experience. This comparison is not about which model is better. It is about understanding how an institution’s identity shapes its narrative possibilities.

The Value of a Frozen Past

This brings me back to the core theme of the Leibniz Research Alliance: What is the ‘Value of the Past’ in our thawing, precarious present?

My time at the Polar Museum has left me reflecting on this very question. The ‘value’ here is not simple. It is also in the tensions the past reveals: the tension between a celebrated heroic narrative and an urgent climate crisis; a tension between the emotional relic in the museum and the real, threatened heritage site on the ice; and the tension between national memory and global responsibility.

The Decolonization attempt of the museum.

Addressing this, the Polar Museum in Cambridge has attempted to develop a dual strategy. The permanent gallery, with its powerful memorial focus, is not the whole story. It is complemented by a dynamic multi-platform strategy like temporary exhibitions, digital programming and educational outreach.

This seems to be the way forward: the permanent gallery fulfills the memorial duty, while the dynamic programming fulfills the contemporary one. The frozen past is not a roadblock; it is the foundation to build upon. The challenge, it seems, is not to discard these powerful, affective legacies, but to influence their power and critically connect them to the urgent, planetary responsibilities of the present.

The Display of the North-West Passage Expedition of Franklin.

Title picture: The Roof Painting illustrating the Arctic and the Antarctic.

All pictures in this blog post were taken by Mohammad Abu Al Hasan, 2025.

Uses of the past in post-Assad politics in Syria

Heike Liebau interviews Birgitte Holst on the role of the past in today’s politics in Syria.

In today’s Syria, various groups invoke particular versions of the past to define the nation and/or homeland. What role does the past play in the transition after the regime change in Damascus?

Im heutigen Syrien berufen sich verschiedene Gruppen auf bestimmte Versionen der Vergangenheit, um die Nation/Heimat zu definieren. Welche Rolle spielt die Vergangenheit beim Übergang nach dem Regimewechsel in Damaskus?


After the toppling of Bashar Al-Assad as President of Syria in December 2024, the issue of what directions the unfolding political transition in the country will take has been a key concern for Syrians but also for international political actors and researchers. To explore the question of what role the past plays in the transition, Birgitte Holst, an anthropologist specialised in Syria, hosted an international workshop on “The uses of the past in the political transition in Syria” at ZMO, Berlin, in October 2025. The workshop was made possible through funding from the Leibniz Research Alliance Value of the Past and after the workshop, Birgitte sat down with Heike Liebau, also of ZMO, to discuss key take-away points.


Heike Liebau: Since the overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad, the political situation in Syria has developed rapidly. You suggest that the past plays a key role in these developments. Could you explain how?

Birgitte Holst: The government that has taken power in Syria is headed by Ahmad Al-Sharaa who is the long-time leader of the group HTS (Hay’a Tahrir Al-Sham). HTS also headed the coalition of Arab Sunni Islamist militant groups that executed the attack that toppled Assad. One of the things we have seen from this new government and their supporters is an emphasis on the fact that the state is now led by Sunnis. This goes against the wish of many religious minorities and secular Sunnis to have a more pluralistic state. Around 75% of Syrians are Sunni. They are mainly Arabs but Kurds, Turkmen and Circassians (who are ethnic minorities) are also predominantly Sunni. The remaining 25% of Syrians are religious minorities like Christians, Druze, Shia, Alawis and Ismailis. The divergent positions that various groups take on the question of who should lead the state invoke particular notions about the character of the Syrian nation or people (الشعب السوري) and the homeland (الوطن). These notions are based to some extent on these numbers, but various groups also invoke particular versions of the past to define the nation and/or homeland.

Map of the Umayyad Empire in 750 CE. From the Historical Atlas by William R. Shepherd, 1926, public domain.

HL: I can imagine that this would not be an easy task, as we also know from other contexts. What does that mean in practice? Can you give an example to illustrate?

BH: Government supporters have for instance invoked a reference to the Umayyad Empire as a historical precedent for the political period Syria is presently in. The Umayyad Empire (661-750) was one of the first Islamic Empires and its capital was Damascus. The reference evokes notions of Islamic greatness as the Umayyads helped spread Islam and took over lands as far away as what is now Spain[1]. The Umayyads still hold a specific significance for Damascus (which is also the present-day Syrian capital). A centre piece of that city is the Umayyad Mosque that stands proud and beautiful in the middle of the old town. When government supporters now claim that the toppling of Assad by Islamist groups amounts to a return of the Umayyads, they are thus suggesting that after decades when it was otherwise Damascus is finally being returned to its rightful rulers. The reference also holds within it a comment on the very recent past. The Umayyad Empire was a Sunni Islamic Empire, and the Shia forces from Iraq that were stationed in Damascus during the civil war (2011-2024) were said to curse the Umayyads. This caused much anguish for Sunnis, especially Sunnis from Damascus, who experienced the presence of these Shia troops as an occupation. They are now pleased that no one can curse the Umayyads in Damascus anymore.

HL: So, if I understand you correctly, this is not an official state version of current events, but the new government is indirectly sanctioning this Sunni vision. Are there counter stories for the idea of a homeland and the role of history? 

BH: Minorities and more secularly inclined Sunnis are invoking instead the past of multiethnic and multireligious conviviality. They point to the presence of Christians in Syria before the presence of Muslims. They point to the ways in which all ethnic and sectarian groups have impacted the landscape and culture of Syria. In some villages, Aramaic, the language spoken by Jesus, is still used. Some of the world’s oldest convents and churches are in Syria. Syria has historically been a land in which sectarian and ethnic minorities could find refuge when they fled persecution elsewhere.[2] Leading minority figures and secular intellectuals (Sunnis and otherwise) want this to be the model on which a new Syria is established.

HL: In October 2025, you hosted a workshop at ZMO, Berlin, where you discussed the issue of what renditions of the past various groups of Syrians have invoked as they have made claims about the Syrian state and homeland during the first year after the fall of Assad. What were the themes that emerged?

BH: One key theme was the question of the balance between claims about the past that are meant to address the issue of what Syria is as a whole versus claims about the past that are very particular and shape rather a group identity within the homeland. While supporters of the new government are trying to paint Syria as an Islamic country with significant religious minorities and some leading secular intellectuals are making the case that Syria is rather an ethnic and religious mosaic, some Sunni tribes in the north and some Druze in the south invoke local customs of political leadership or local histories of political conflict to formulate a particularistic political position in the present. Hence, an image of a Syria where some groups are attempting to define the nation while other groups are staking out their own claims to an equal place in the homeland emerged.

HL: What are the wider lessons we can take from this? What is the relevance for the study of other contexts?

BH: Syria is a land that has a historical experience with multiethnic and multireligious conviviality and conflict. This is bound to be an issue when the homeland – or the nation, if you want to use that term – and the state is defined anew. However, the relationship between various forms of multiplicity and the definition of the homeland and state can also be key to political contests in other contexts and a focus on them can therefore provide grounds for comparative research and for thinking across diverse settings. In Denmark we have seen an ongoing and intensifying debate over immigration that really took off in the mid-1990s. One recurrent theme has been the supposedly homogenous character of the Danish people. Some political groups claim that ethnic Danes have inhabited the land for centuries, others point to the Christian traditions that have shaped the cultural and social practices of the Danes for centuries and others again point to the struggles in the 20th century to build a welfare state and secure women’s rights as what defines the Danish nation. On the other side stand political groups that invoke a historical openness to others and a welcoming of those who needed safety as what makes Denmark Denmark. While these references to the past are meant to justify political claims, they also come to shape the political projects of various groups as the values they claim as Danish based on specific renditions of the past then become leitmotifs in their political programs. It is too early to say but it would be interesting to follow whether a similar development will unfold in Syria.

HL: That comparison could perhaps be the topic of another conversation. Thank you very much for these analyses and assessments.


[1] Hourani, Albert. 1991. A History of the Arab Peoples. London: Faber and Faber.

[2] Chatty, Dawn. 2017. Syria: The making and unmaking of a refuge nation. London: Hurst.


Title picture: The revolutionary Syrian flag adorns Al-Hijaz train station in Damascus in February 2025. The station was built in 1913 by the Ottomans but has long seized to be a functioning part of the train net in Syria. Image by Birgitte Holst.

Between Sacredness and Bulldozers: The Struggle over Sulaiman-Too’s Cemeteries

Aksana Ismailbekova writes about the competing claims on Sulaiman-Too, the only UNESCO World Heritage Site in Kyrgyzstan, and how memory and development clash in this context.

Sulaiman-Too in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, intertwines sacred space, religion, memory, and kinship. Cemeteries honor ancestors, transmit knowledge, and sustain community, yet state-led urban development threatens graves, exposing tensions between heritage, religious devotion, and modernization.

Sulaiman-Too in Osch, Kirgistan, verbindet heilige Erde, Religion, Erinnerung und Familien miteinander. Die Friedhöfe dort dienen der Ehrung der Vorfahren, sie vermitteln Wissen und stärken die Gemeinschaft, doch die staatlich gelenkte Stadtentwicklung bedroht die Gräber und offenbart Spannungen zwischen Kulturerbe, religiöser Hingabe und Modernisierung.


Sulaiman-Too (“Solomon’s Mountain”), a UNESCO World Heritage Site in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. For centuries it has been a pilgrimage site and sacred burial ground. Photo: Aksana Ismailbekova.

In Central Asia, as in many parts of the world, to disturb the dead is to disturb the moral order. Graves are not mere plots of land; they are nodes in a network of sacred relations. When the state burns or bulldozes cemeteries, it risks burning bridges of trust with its citizens. This intertwining of sacred space, memory, and community is not limited to cemeteries alone. It extends to other sites of devotion and pilgrimage, such as Sulaiman-Too, the sacred mountain which is located at the heart of Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan. The mountain is not only a geological landmark in the Fergana Valley, but also a spiritual place that has attracted pilgrims, saints, migrants, and ordinary believers for centuries. Sulaiman-Too was a site of ritual devotion. This mountain also has a reputation of being a holy place, hosting shrines, mosques, and sacred caves[1].

But Sulaiman-Too is also a place for the deceased relatives of many Osh residents. Since Soviet times, the mountain’s slopes are occupied by numerous cemeteries — the resting places of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tatars, and others who used to live in Osh and called this their home. Among the graves lie prominent Soviet-era singers, scholars, community leaders, and ordinary local people. The families of these people would get together during Ramadan to clean the graves, pray, and honour the memory of their ancestors. This commemoration is also an important family and religious ritual where all the family members within several generations would learn the importance of the remembrance of their deceased relatives, passing on oral knowledge about the names and lives of their ancestors that might otherwise be forgotten[2]. This is a key part of local kinship systems, linking past, present and future through social gatherings during Ramadan.

Yet, in recent years this sacred geography has collided with the ambitions of the current state. The recent cemeteries have been burned, graves dismantled, and bones exhumed in the name of urban development, road extension, and “green zones.” As the mayor of the city said ‘let us remove all the cemeteries in order to create a green zone to earn money from tourists’[3].

A Cemetery in Conflict

Local residents recall that during the Soviet Union, the state decided to use Sulaiman-Too for burials — partly due to a shortage of land, partly to free up fertile fields for cotton production. Between the 1960s and 1978, the southern cemetery was active; burials in the northern cemetery continued until as late as 2013. In total, more than a thousand people were laid to rest on the slopes.

By law, graves should not be reused or repurposed until at least 25–30 years have passed. Yet, according to residents, the state began pressuring families to relocate remains barely 13 years after the last burials. Bulldozers appeared. The mayor’s office spoke of re-cultivation, greening, and urban development[4].

Every year some tragic episodes occur where parts of the cemeteries are burnt in what are apparently wildfires. Official explanations point to climatic conditions and accidental fires. Some local residents, however, pin blame on a lack of water due to the state not maintaining irrigation systems, and others see it as an intentional attempt to clear space for new projects.

For many families in Osh, this was not only an outrage but a deep spiritual violation. As one elderly resident told me, “99% of those buried here are our ancestors. Some of the bones belong to people whose children and grandchildren are still alive, live nearby and visit them often. This place is sacred for Uzbeks, but also for all the peoples of Osh.”

Cemetries near the Sulaiman Mountain. Photo by a local resident (anonymous).

Three Days to Collect the Dead

In July 2025, the situation also escalated dramatically in other parts of Osh city, where the decision was to remove the cemeteries located near the local mahallas in order to widen the roads. Residents were told they had just three days to exhume their relatives and re-bury them elsewhere. Those who lived in Osh had to carry bones down the mountain and pay the required 3,000 som (30 Euro) fee for a new burial site[5]. But what about families who had migrated to Russia or Europe? Many could not return in time. Their ancestors’ remains were collected in heaps, with bones buried together in communal graves.

This rushed process left many residents in shock. An 88-year-old male informant, whose parents were buried on the mountain, recalled bitterly: “We have lived here for generations. How can they [the State] tell us our cemeteries must disappear? They want to make a park, a green zone. But our ancestors deserve peace. Let the deceased rest in peace, please!”

Development vs. Memory

The dispute over Sulaiman-Too’s cemeteries is not just about land. It is about ethnicity, such as Uzbek mahalla cemeteries versus the Kyrgyz state. It is also the clash between heritage and development, sacredness and business. The state envisions wide roads, recreational spaces, and tourist-friendly landscapes. But Osh residents envision continuity — a landscape where the living cares for the dead, where cemeteries signify communal identity, and inter-generational knowledge is transferred.

One of the most painful aspects has been the silencing of disagreement. Few locals dare to protest openly, fearing repercussions from the authorities. One man explained, “We cannot express our opinions, as this may lead to problems and pressure from the state.” Another added, “Please broaden the road on the other side of the road. But don’t disturb the graves.” Their requests, however, were ignored.

The cemetery of the Soviet deputy,Sultanov Kadyrmat, who used to be a member of national parliament. Photo by a local resident (anonymous).

Sacred Mountain, Global Heritage

The irony is that Sulaiman-Too is a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Its cultural and spiritual significance is internationally recognized. Tourists climb its trails, visiting sacred caves and shrines. Yet, the cemeteries — equally a part of its sacred landscape — are treated as obstacles to development.

For some locals, hope lies precisely in UNESCO. One community elder, Aziz, aged 76, expressed faith that international protection might shield their cemeteries: “UNESCO supported us before. They sponsored our houses. Tourists do not only come to see the mountain or the apartment blocks, but also to see the traditional houses of the people living there, their clothing, and their customs. Maybe they will protect us again.”

But UNESCO’s mandate is limited, and cultural heritage often becomes a battleground of selective preservation. Which parts of the past deserve saving? Which can be erased for the sake of “progress”?

Why Cemeteries Matter

To outsiders, it may be tempting to see cemeteries as replaceable, especially in crowded cities, such as Osh. Yet anthropology reminds us that cemeteries are not just about the dead — they are about the living. They are places where memory is protected, where families renew bonds across generations, where cultural identity is affirmed. This is the heart of the local kinship system, Islam and community.

It is precisely this deeper social and religious significance that makes current developments in Osh resonate with earlier historical struggles. There is a parallel between Soviet times and today: while burial rites were actively defended against state repression during the Soviet era, today they face new pressures—urban development and shifting social priorities—that threaten their continuity. In both cases, cemeteries symbolize a boundary for the community, marking a domain where religious identity and kinship ties must be protected. As Marianne Kamp (2010) argues, during the Soviet times death practices (i.e., performing funeral prayers) represented a kind of red line for Central Asians, and many were ready to defend them against the state at any cost, especially when other religious practices were repressed.[6]

Between Stones and Stories

The story of Sulaiman-Too’s cemeteries is unfinished. After the Soviet times, new state projects (i.e. between Soviet times and the current developments in Osh) threaten the graves every year. Each year, the state plans the expansion of roads against the quiet resistance of families. Meanwhile, tourists snap photos of the mountain, unaware that just beyond the trail lies a battlefield of memory.

As one local put it emotionally: “This is not only a cemetery. It is our history, our ancestors, our identity. To erase it is to erase us.”

The future of Sulaiman-Too will depend on whether development can learn to coexist with sacredness — whether roads and green zones can be built without uprooting bones. For now, the mountain stands as a reminder: heritage is not just about monuments, but about the fragile bond between the living and the dead.


[1] Liu, Morgan. 2012. Under Solomon’s Throne. Uzbek Visions of Renewal in Osh. Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press.

[2] Ismailbekova, A. 2017 Blood Ties and the Native Son: Poetics of Patronage in Kyrgyzstan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

[3] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1157690362852446&rdid=Hhg4YvfQirEo59NI

[4] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1157690362852446&rdid=Hhg4YvfQirEo59NI

[5] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1101498778600604&rdid=bCohodiCTh5OaIFm

[6] Kamp, M. (2010) ‘Where did the mullahs go? Oral histories from rural Uzbekistan’, Die Welt des Islams, 50(3–4), pp. 503–531.


Title picture: Gateway to a staircase leading to a museum precinct on Sulaiman-Too mountain. Adam Harangozó, CC BY-SA 4.0.