How did Russia respond to Finland’s NATO membership at the official level, and what narrative has been built since then towards Helsinki? This blog post analyses the Russian official strategic narrative, presented by the President of Russia, and other Russian officials.
Wie hat Russland auf offizieller Ebene auf den NATO-Beitritt Finnlands reagiert, und wie hat sich seitdem die Haltung gegenüber Helsinki entwickelt? Dieser Blogbeitrag analysiert die offizielle strategische Haltung Russlands, wie sie vom russischen Präsidenten und anderen russischen Amtsträgern vertreten wird.
On 24 February 2022 Russia initiated a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine. 17 May 2022 Finland applied for NATO membership, which was followed by the official invitation on 5 July 2022, and a full membership on 4 April 2023. This decision has become a milestone in the Finnish foreign and security policy after decades of a very reserved policy called Finlandization. This policy was elaborated after the Winter War of 1939-40, when Helsinki lost part of its territory to the USSR, and the Continuation War of 1941-1944, which was fought and lost by Finland and Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union and later led Finland to choose a strategy that would not be seen as provocative and threatening by Moscow. The Finlandization concept meant substantial limitation of Helsinki’s autonomy in elaborating and implementing foreign and security policymaking. And it totally excluded full membership in the NATO, unless the situation would fundamentally change. According to the numerous statements of Finnish officials, the brutal violation of the international order, including the UN Charter, has become the reason to take such a decision. It should also be noted that Finnish officials attempted to serve as a mediator, relying on their profoundly good relations with Russia, prior to the invasion trying to persuade Moscow to deescalate the situation.[1] Those attempts failed. Additional factors that conditioned the decision relate to the geostrategic position of Finland that shares a common border with Russia of 1,340 km, and dramatic historical experience.

A broader explanation of the reasons for the decision taken was also presented in official foreign and security documents of Finland. In these documents, the whole responsibility is placed on Russia and the change in its behavior is recognized as long-standing, when Russia itself is perceived as an existential threat.[2] Particularly, the historic-political narratives are identified as one of the major instruments Moscow has applied against Ukraine since 2014.[3] As Finland was placed by Moscow on the list of “unfriendly countries”[4], the probability of hostile actions (from political pressure up to military threats) from the Russian side was acknowledged.
The Russian response to Finland’s NATO membership has been addressed predominantly to the domestic audience, but also towards Finland and the US and NATO.
The key components of the new Russian narrative towards Finland are based on the following affirmative statements:
Finland has not been viewed by Russia in the same light as Ukraine, because of the absence of such problems that Moscow has with Kyiv.[5] Even more, Vladimir Putin described them as “ideal prior to Helsinki’s decision to join NATO”.[6]
The Finnish decision to join NATO cannot be explained from the security perspective, as security threats were absent at the moment when the decision was taken. Therefore, abandoning the policy of military neutrality, which was a part of Finlandization, is defined as a mistake, though the right to join the Alliance has been recognized. Even further, military non-alignment has been defined by the Russian officials as a conscious choice following the outcome of World War II.[7] Later, during the recent Valdai Discussion Club meeting 2025, Vladimir Putin, speaking about Finland’s decision, defined it as a “stupid move”, which could have been lobbied by certain nationalist-minded forces fearing Russia’s growing presence in Finland.[8] He also denied that there were any interests of Finland that should be protected by NATO and mentioned that Russia did not have plans to invade and seize Finland. In other words, there is a shift in perception and assessment of Helsinki’s decision to join the Alliance in the direction of devaluing and openly questioning it, what has not been the case earlier.
However, the fact of NATO membership would affect Russo-Finnish relations, also in the defense and military domain. The Finnish decision is taken as a justification of increased military build-up on the Russian side to counterbalance the threats stemming from the Finnish side due to its membership. In other words, the responsibility for further hostilities between two countries has been placed on Helsinki. However, during the Valdai Discussion Club meeting 2025, President Putin assumed that Helsinki’s decision was conditioned by the willingness to grab part of the Russian territory under the condition of Russia’s strategic defeat.[9] In other words, Vladimir Putin stresses hostile intentions, which provides Moscow with the ability to harshen its rhetoric and apply more aggressive means against Finland.

Simultaneously, this narrative has been incorporated into a bigger one, about NATO-Russia confrontation. Within this narrative, Helsinki has been treated as a subordinated object, and its decision to join the Alliance is seen as an imposed one on Finland by NATO.[10] During the Biden administration, Moscow portrayed NATO as the US foreign policy instrument to control its satellites.[11] According to Russia’s narrative, it is NATO that has initiated a military build-up on the territory of a new member, and Russia has no other option but to react properly. This reaction is addressed at NATO structures, but not Finland itself. In late December 2023 President Putin spoke about increased NATO activity along Russian borders and blamed the Alliance for its aggressive nature.[12] By developing the narrative, Putin attributed the idea of global supremacy to the US, which could be achieved particularly by enlarging NATO. In order to reach the aim, according to President Putin, containment of Russia was needed and Finland would play its imposed role in the strategy. Statements about Finland’s dependency on the US and NATO authorities were reproduced by Russian officials on different occasions, not necessarily connected with the fact of accession itself. The extension of the narrative has included the following block that states the existence of an alleged confrontation between defense spending and economic and social development of Finland.[13] Further, the Russian narrative is constructing an extremely divided society, whereas most of the population was not divided on the decision of joining the NATO and supports an increased defence spending. Moscow has also tried to state that the decision has been imposed on the Finnish society, without considering public opinion.

The Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region has seen a fundamental security change in, turning them into insecure ones after decades of stability and peaceful co-existence. The dramatic worsening of the security situation is attributed to the Finnish decision of joining NATO, but not to the Russian brutal violation of international order and the UN Charter principles. Even more, when speaking about Helsinki’s modern foreign and security policy, Russian officials have drawn dodgy historical comparisons, particularly in citing Finland’s partnering with Nazi Germany.[14] As Third Reich fought against the USSR, such reminders might refer to the alleged evil nature of Finland and its hidden negative attitude towards Russia, with prospective territorial claims. This assumption has been repeated recently by Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy head of the Russian Security Council.[15] In the same vein, he announced that Finland has initiated preparations for war against Russia but threatened that such a war would end the Finnish statehood. As this statement has been produced recently, it might serve as a sign of a new round of escalation with Helsinki that might include an increased military build-up along the Russo-Finnish border, or other assertive moves on the ground. Medvedev’s article has been analyzed by the Institute for the Study of War, and, according to their fundings, he used lexis and narratives similar to those the Kremlin applied before invading Ukraine twice.[16]
For the last three years the Russian Federation has elaborated a strategic narrative towards Finland and its accession to the Alliance, gradually increasing the tone of statements, which are followed by practical measures. In addition, Moscow has manipulated with historical facts, making crude comparisons and analogies between the modern times and the 1930-40s, when Finland was an Ally of Nazi Germany, without providing explanations and the context. In this regard, history is used by Russian officials to strengthen its narrative about Finland and justify its growing hostile attitude towards it. The expansion of the narrative should be expected, as its incorporation into a bigger narrative of confrontation with Europe and NATO. Accordingly, such a trend is long-standing, and will affect the bilateral relations between Finland and Russia in the long run.

[1] Esch, C., & Scheuermann, C. (2022, February 14). “Suddenly, He Started To Behave in a Very, Very Decisive Way”. DER SPIEGEL International. https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/finnish-president-sauli-niinistoe-on-putin-and-the-ukraine-conflict-a-bb9281d3-2cc6-49a1-87eb-199569991c79
[2] Finnish Government. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. (2022). Government report on changes in the security environment (Publications of the Finnish Government 2022:20). https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/server/api/core/bitstreams/ffe15198-2b87-45f8-abcf-0ed3cf45de58/content; Ministry of Defence. (2024). Government Defence Report (Publications of the Ministry of Defence 2024:7). https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/server/api/core/bitstreams/277ab3c9-ebfe-40a7-89af-4a2faa60c042/content
[3] Finnish Government. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. (2022). Government report on changes in the security environment (Publications of the Finnish Government 2022:20). https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/server/api/core/bitstreams/ffe15198-2b87-45f8-abcf-0ed3cf45de58/content, p. 8.
[4] Ibid., p. 10; Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации. (2022, 25 июля). Двусторонние отношения со страной Финляндия.https://mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1102852/
[5] Официальный веб-сайт Президента России. (2022, 29 июня). Владимир Путин ответил на вопросы журналистов. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68783
[6] Официальный веб-сайт Президента России. (2024, 13 марта). Интервью Дмитрию Киселеву. Владимир Путин ответил на вопросы Дмитрия Киселева. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73648
[7] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2023, April 4). Foreign Ministry Statement on Finland completing the process to join NATO. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1861613/?lang=en
[8] Официальный веб-сайт Президента России. (2025, 2 октября). Заседание дискуссионного клуба «Валдай». http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78134
[9] Ibid.
[10] Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации. (2022, 12 мая). Заявление МИД России о членстве Финляндии в НАТО. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1812971/
[11] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2023, May 24).Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at the 11th International Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues, Moscow, May 24, 2023. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1872035/?lang=en; Официальный веб-сайт Президента России. (2022, 29 июня). Владимир Путин ответил на вопросы журналистов. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68783
[12] Официальный веб-сайт Президента России. (2023, 19 декабря).Расширенное заседание коллегии Минобороны. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73035
[13] Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации. (2025. 8 февраля). Интервью Посла России в Финляндии П.М.Кузнецова РИА Новости по случаю Дня дипломатического работника, 8 февраля 2025 г. https://mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1995290/
[14] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2025, 7 July).On Historical and International Legal Accountability of Finland for the Occupation of Karelia During Great Patriotic War (WWII) (1941–1944) (Report by the Representative office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in Petrozavodsk). https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/istoricheskie_materialy/2034551/?lang=en
[15] Медведев, Д. (2025, 8 сентября). Новая финская доктрина: глупость, ложь, неблагодарность. ТАСС. https://tass.ru/opinions/24989035
[16] Institute for the Study of War. (2025, September 8). Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2025. https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2025/
Olena Podvorna received a Leibniz-Newcastle University Fellowship in 2025. She is a displaced scholar from Ukraine. From 2023 to 2025 she was a Senior Researcher at PRIF’s Research Department International Institutions and leader of the DFG-funded project “A New Role for NATO in the High North? The European Arctic and Russia’s War Against Ukraine”.
Title picture: A Finnish Maxim M/32-33 machine gun nest 100 metres from Soviet forces during the Winter War, located approximately 5 kilometres north of Lemetti (area of the modern Pitkyarantsky District, Russia), 21 February 1940. Military Museum of Finland, CC BY 4.0.















