Schlagwort: Iran

As Parts I and II have shown, inherited political idioms in Iran have become unreliable under the weight of state violence. Grief and refusal have therefore been rerouted into the body and, as Part III argues, into vernacular repertoires.

Wie Teil I und II zeigen, haben sich herkömmliche politische Redewendungen im Iran unter dem Druck staatlicher Gewalt als unzuverlässig erwiesen. Trauer und Verweigerung werden stattdessen durch den Körper kanalisiert und, wie in Teil III dargelegt wird, durch neue umgangssprachliche Redewendungen.

When protesters were killed on January 8 and 9, 2026, the public pointedly refused the state’s lexicon and did not call them shaheed (martyr). That displacement became even clearer in late February, when the Supreme Leader was killed in a US-Israeli airstrike and officially declared a shaheed by state media, confirming what the earlier refusal had already announced: that the word had become the establishment’s property. In many recent commemorations, those killed by the state are called jāvid-nām (everlasting name), farzand-e mihan (child of the homeland), or jān-fadā-ye mihan (one who gave their life for the homeland) instead of shaheed—a word many now feel has been captured by the state and by the founding narrative through which the Islamic Republic legitimized itself. At first glance, the turn toward mihan (homeland) can look like a simple secular-national substitution. Yet one strand of this reorientation—sharpened during the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom movement after the killing of the Kurdish woman Jina Amini—reimagines national community laterally, through vernacular voices and mother tongues.

The auditory life of this vernacular polyphony appears in the way music now travels across regional lines. Grief widens to include the pain of different ethnic and linguistic communities, and what the state’s nationalist imaginary once treated as regional becomes part of a shared soundscape. The Lori song “Dāya Dāya,” often linked in oral histories to resistance in Lorestan during World War I, is being resung and remixed across genres; Kurdish laments, Lori mourning rhythms and dance traditions long treated as peripheral now move to the center of public mourning. A Mazandarani dance song, “Dele Dige,” once danced at parties by many who would later be killed in the protests, now returns at their funerals as the sound accompanying grieving families across Iran. The archive widens beyond regional repertoires to older and once-policed popular songs. The early twentieth-century constitutional-era anthem “Az khun-e javānān-e vatan lāleh damide” (Tulips rise from the blood of the nation’s youth) resurfaces, as it has whenever young people are killed, and the songs of the exiled singer Dariush—now reworked by a new generation of hip hop and popular musicians—are taken up again. In this widened archive, classed hierarchies of taste are rearranged: repertoires once dismissed as too popular or unfancy become shared vocabularies of belonging and loss. What returns is not nostalgia but usable material—music that once lived in taxis and private spaces, kept outside political or cultivated public culture, now heard in new juxtapositions that make audible a changed vernacular soundscape of opposition.

This expanded archive includes newer forms of vernacular performance such as rap. The rapper Bacheh Lur (“Lur kid,” invoking Luri identity), in a video posted to Instagram in January 2026, covers his face with a scarf associated with Kurdish and Luri dress and situates himself in Khorramabad: “the mountains are tall and the valleys are deep; be careful not to fall, all of you together.” From within that swaggering warning to the state and its forces, he also names the pain of the city as inseparable from his own: “These are the pains of my city, as wide as my heart.” He recasts gharbzadegi (West-struckness) as ghamzadegi (grief-struckness): “bro calls me gharbzadeh [West-struck]; I myself have become ghamzadeh [grief-struck].” If gharbzadegi named, in Jalal Al-e Ahmad’s influential 1960s critique, a condition of alienated and imitative modernity, then this reformulation suggests that inherited idioms of social diagnosis have lost much of their explanatory grip and that grief now names the truer mark of the present.[1] Yet this grief is articulated from the mountainous world of Khorramabad, through a register in which local landscape, wounded attachment, swagger, masking, and vernacular visual codes make sorrow and defiance audible at once. The song closes with his certainty that one day he will be arrested for his singing. Defiance and its cost are held in the same breath, and when words give out, he ends the song with a scream.

What this widened archive reveals is a shift in how national belonging is being imagined. If a nation is, in Benedict Anderson’s sense, an “imagined community,” then what matters here is the way shared belonging is being reconstituted through vernacular forms rather than through the state’s sacralized script.[2] Within strands of opposition, grief travels sideways: a stranger killed by the state becomes someone I come to know through the particular forms in which their loss is carried, whether in a family’s ritual, a vernacular song, or a mother tongue. National belonging is thus practiced across difference, preserving distance even as relation is forged. In Bakhtin’s terms, the state’s centripetal drive toward a unitary official language is interrupted by the centrifugal force of socially distinct voices, idioms, and speech worlds within a single language.[3] Some of those voices are ones the government can neither speak nor claim as its own.

This vernacular reclaiming extends beyond melody and into the street’s own language, where rejection of the Islamic Republic is increasingly voiced through a profane lexicon. Since the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom movement, chants have circulated that use explicit curse words, insult the nāmus (honor) of officials—most often the former Supreme Leader and his office—or crudely desecrate state symbols. This lexicon ranges from culinary satire to explicitly sexualized insult, often mobilizing inherited traces of patriarchy against the state’s claims to sanctity. Its force is therefore double: it profanes the regime’s sacred self-presentation, but does so by drawing on codes in which the degradation of female kin becomes the medium of humiliation. In this context, profanity functions as an immediate weapon, valued for speed, force, and collective cadence; it strips the regime of the reverence on which its authority depends. Banned words return the way banned songs do, as collective public repertoire. A regime that claims sacred authority is dragged down into the dirt of the street, even as those forms of insult remain entangled with the very patriarchy many many protesters seek to undo.

The state’s reaction to this tonal rupture clarifies what is at stake for its self-presentation as sacred authority. In a widely circulated response, the pro-regime speaker Hesamuddin Haerizadeh describes Women, Life, Freedom movement as the moment when “fohsh sho’ār shod”—when obscene cursing became a protest slogan—chanted collectively and amplified online. He lingers on the fact that it surfaced at Sharif University of Technology, among students widely known as nokhbeh—the country’s top STEM talents—and treats that detail as proof that a line had been crossed in public life. He recodes this profane register as a civilizational threat, pairing fohsh (obscene cursing) with fahshā (sexual indecency) and naming both as pornocracy: the rule of base desire over sacred order. Citing Usul al-Kafi, he casts fohsh as shamelessness (bi-haya’i) and even as “partnership with Satan.” In this frame, the chant becomes evidence of corruption at the level of origin and lineage—a failure of “purity of lineage” (tahārat-e nasab)—so that profanity appears as a symptom rather than as politics. By recasting the political chant as a symptom of tainted lineage, the state attempts to move the conflict out of the realm of grievance and into that of pathology, rendering the protester not a citizen but a corruption to be purged.

Re-singing a regional song, taking up a banned popular archive, or chanting in a profane register becomes a way of reclaiming a home the state can no longer credibly narrate as its own. Families keep their children’s deaths from being absorbed into the state’s narrative by mourning in their own idioms, while strangers take up those forms as a shared claim without erasing the differences that shape them. That plurality is the force of the moment, even as it remains exposed to renewed projects of homogeneity—whether through state repression or through reactive nationalism within the opposition, which welcomes vernacular culture only when its political claims are muted. The turn to the vernacular is thus more than a cultural shift: it is a tactical evacuation of a contaminated linguistic order. What emerges from that evacuation is a home reclaimed from the ruins of a poisoned language, but one still pressed on multiple sides by violence and the costs of refusal.

1: Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi (Weststruckness), trans. John Green and Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1982).

2: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006), 6–7.

3: M. M. Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 270–272.

Title image: “A greeting to those who have stayed close to us in our dreams for forty days, though distant when we are awake.” Calligraphy by Sina Afshar, January 2026.

All images in this contribution are shared here with consent of the creators.

When the state saturates inherited words with the memory of its violence, those words become unreliable as public idioms of grief and resistance. Part I traced that damage at the level of inherited idioms; Part II follows its rerouting into the body, through which grief is carried and made public.

Wenn der Staat lang überlieferten Begriffen durch seine Gewalt eine andere Erinnerung einschreibt, verlieren diese Worte ihre Eignung als öffentliche Ausdrucksformen der Trauer und des Widerstands. Teil I hat diesen Verlust auf der Ebene der Ausdrucksformen nachgezeichnet; Teil II verfolgt die Umleitung in die Körper, durch die Trauer transportiert und öffentlich gemacht wird.

At the funerals of protesters killed by the state during the January 2026 uprising, mourners gathered at gravesides and turned to bodily gesture: they danced, clapped, ululated, and played music in a space where sorrow and Qur’anic recitation were expected. The street had already made the body the primary ground of confrontation, as protesters advanced against armed forces with nothing but their bodies. At the graveside, it became the medium through which grief was carried when inherited idioms had failed and public mourning had to proceed under threat and surveillance. In March 2026, on the last Thursday of the Iranian year, mourners gathered at Sepehr Shokri’s graveside to commemorate Sepehr, who had been killed during the January 2026 protests. Facing threats of further violence from state forces, his mother cried out: “You have weapons; my son only had a chest. He came forward with his chest alone.” Her subsequent declaration—“we have nothing left to lose”—names a condition in which state violence and absolute dispossession leave the bare body as the final ground of confrontation. Arman Gorjian’s father names a related dispossession at his son’s graveside: “We have reached absolute poverty. We doubt your Islam… I had seen dance ceremonies, but I had never seen a mother dance at the grave of her dead child.” His phrasing links two shifts: the dispossession of inherited idioms, as the state’s Islam no longer functions as a credible language of resistance, and the emergence of an unprecedented bodily grammar of grief. For both parents, what remains is not joy but a condition of absolute poverty. In one scene, the poverty appears as the body stripped to exposure; in the other, as language stripped of credibility.

Taha Soleimani’s funeral shows what this “absolute poverty” sounds like when language itself gives out. Taha Soleimani had been missing for twenty days after his arrest. When his family finally received his body, it bore the marks of torture. He was dead. His uncle begins to speak—“my nephew was lost”—but as he tries to continue, to name what has happened, he runs out of words. He falls into a thick, suffocating silence. He raises his hands and asks those around him to clap. They begin at once, together, as if the cue were already familiar. The clapping breaks the silence and gives it a pulse. Grief becomes collective without a slogan. Rhythm here is not joy but kinetic testimony.

Taha Soleimani’s funeral

Several commentators have read the dancing and clapping at the funerals of protesters killed by the state as soog-e shad or joyous mourning. Nahid Siamdoust, for instance, frames them as an extension of the “affective politics of joy” she traces in Iran’s alternative public sphere. In her reading, because women’s public dancing in streets and buses previously formed “joyous counterpublics,” the funeral dances must arise from that same genealogy. But this commits a category error: it treats resemblance in gesture as proof of shared intent. A dance on a bus and a mother’s movement at her child’s grave may resemble one another in form, but they are not the same act. One is an elective claim to visibility; the other is an embodied testimony unfolding in a space saturated by loss and surveillance. The “joy” frame rests on an assumption of expressive abundance—a sudden, self-assertive break into visibility—yet these funerary gestures emerge not from surplus but from scarcity and devastation.

If Taha Soleimani’s funeral shows how rhythm fills the space where language breaks down, Arshia Barari’s shows the bodily cost of that shift. His mother dances and suddenly collapses, a gesture grief alone might produce, but one that carries more weight here. The body is being asked to bear more than grief alone: catastrophic loss, refusal of the state’s script, and the burden of making that refusal publicly legible. The collapse registers a limit, a point at which the body, made into a medium, can no longer bear all that is being asked of it.

Arshia Barari’s funeral

This embodied shift is at times strategic. At the chehelom (fortieth-day commemoration) of Sepehr Shokri, a family member asked the crowd to stop chanting political slogans. The threat was clear: if the chanting continued, security forces would return and smash the gravestone. In place of slogans, he redirected grief into sound, urging mourners to clap and perform kel zadan, the high-pitched ululation often reserved for weddings. Rhythm here is a rerouting produced under coercion, a way to keep mourning public without handing the state material it can seize and punish.

These funeral gestures do not replace older idioms of mourning. In a widely circulated clip, at the chehelom of Ilya Ojaqlou, his mother dances and then, mid-motion, breaks into matam-like self-striking, an embodied form of Shi’i mourning lament. Her body buckles and others rush to hold her up. The abrupt pivot shows that dance and matam can coexist in the same body, in the same moment, blocking any easy reading of the dance as joy. In another viral video from the chehelom commemoration of Hesam Asivand in Lali, Khuzestan, mourners perform sineh-zani, the rhythmic chest-striking associated with Shiʿi mourning for Hossein, for Hesam. As a male relative strikes his chest with increasing intensity, his body lurches and sways until he nearly collapses, and another mourner steps in to hold him. Mourning for Hossein and mourning for the present dead converge here at the level of gesture. Karbala returns here as an embodied grammar of grief: the hand no longer keeps time with a distant sacred story alone, but registers the pain of a contemporary crime. In repurposing sineh-zani for those killed by the state, mourners turn a sacred repertoire long claimed by the establishment against the establishment itself.

At Rostam Mobarakabadi’s chehelom. Screenshots by author.

At Rostam Mobarakabadi’s February 2026 chehelom, the graveside becomes a site where disparate idioms of mourning are recomposed into a vernacular ritual language. Rostam’s mother holds his portrait high, her steady posture giving the image a public bearing. Together, body and photograph testify to her son’s life ended by state violence. Beside her, a female relative keeps time with a gesture that sits in the tense middle ground between dast zadan (clapping) and matam, weighted by a downward beat that echoes sineh-zani without becoming it. She claps with a heavy, percussive force, a pulse drawn inward toward the heart rather than outward in celebration. The murdered son’s name is Rostam, invoking the hero of the Shahnameh, and the anthem sung at the graveside calls up Kaveh the Blacksmith against Zahhak, the tyrant of Persian epic. The scene does not belong to a single tradition; it is a vernacular synthesis in which Shiʿi cadence, dance, and the Shahnameh’s mythic register layer without resolving their tension. By casting the street as a “trench” and the present ruler as Zahhak, the lyrics draw on an epic vocabulary of revolt to name injustice and commemorate the dead without returning to the state’s idiom.

Taken at face value, testamentary requests for music, dancing, and joy can mislead. Mehrzad Nazari, killed during the January 2026 protests, wrote in his will that his family should abstain from crying, mourning rituals, Qur’an recitation, and prayer, and instead play music and remain joyful. Before his execution during the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom movement, Majid Reza Rahnavard similarly asked that his funeral be marked not by sorrow but by dancing and happiness. The “joyous mourning” reading folds such requests too quickly into a narrative of affective rupture. The problem is methodological: by taking these requests at face value, Siamdoust’s reading approaches these funerals through a prior thesis—an “affective politics of joy”—so that the archive of funerary videos can only confirm what the framework has already rendered legible. The result is an erasure: by gathering these heterogeneous practices into a single story of “joyous” renewal, the framework obscures the coercion, devastation, and “absolute poverty” that pressure these bodies into motion.

What recurs across these scenes is not a single logic of rupture and refounding but a pressured recomposition. The Lur tradition of dancing at funerals is itself a mourning custom, not a joy tradition. Nor do these scenes resolve into the “authentic Persian culture” against state-imposed Islamic culture that the framework assumes: sineh-zani returns as an embodied Shiʿi repertoire, and Rostam Mobarakabadi’s chehelom layers Shiʿi cadence, Shahnameh epic, embodied gesture, and protest poetics without privileging any single tradition. Under duress, regional mourning customs, inherited sacred repertoires, and embodied improvisation are brought into proximity by loss, generating fragments of new political idioms assembled unevenly. If anything links these disparate acts, it is the condition named by Arman Gorjian’s father: “absolute poverty,” in which mourning and refusal must work with whatever remains.

But the body is not grief’s only medium. Part III turns to the vernacular infrastructures through which grief travels sideways into regional mother tongues and vernacular repertoires, where belonging is rebuilt under pressure.

Title image: Grieving figures dance, embrace the dead, cut their hair, and play music in acts of embodied mourning. Illustration by Farinaz Soleimani, January 2026.

All images in this contribution are shared here with consent of the creators.