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Remembering Viktor Tsoi: Soviet Rock Heritage and the Politics of Commemoration in the Post-Soviet Space

Alexandra Kolesnik writes about Viktor Tsoi – leader of the legendary Soviet rock band Kino – and what the multiple memorial walls, monuments and other sites which commemorate him tell us today about Soviet rock heritage.

Who owns Soviet rock heritage? More than three decades after Viktor Tsoi’s death, memorial walls, monuments, and commemorative sites across the post-Soviet space reveal how cultural heritage is continually created, contested, and reinterpreted through struggles over memory, identity, and political belonging.

Wem gehört das Erbe des sowjetischen Rock? Mehr als drei Jahrzehnte nach Viktor Tsois Tod zeigen Gedenkmauern, Denkmäler und Erinnerungsorte im gesamten postsowjetischen Raum, wie kulturelles Erbe durch Auseinandersetzungen um Erinnerung, Identität und politische Zugehörigkeit ständig neu geschaffen, umkämpft und neu interpretiert wird.


In the post-Soviet space, the legacy of Soviet rock music has become increasingly visible – and increasingly contested. Walls covered in graffiti, memorial plaques, monuments, guided tours, exhibitions, and fan gatherings have transformed musicians of the late Soviet era into objects of cultural heritage. Yet these commemorative practices are more than nostalgia. They have become sites where questions of memory, identity, and political belonging are actively negotiated.

The case of Viktor Tsoi – leader of the legendary Soviet rock band Kino – offers a particularly revealing lens through which to examine these dynamics. Since Tsoi’s death in 1990, fans have created a remarkable transnational network of memorial sites stretching across Belarus, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Russia, and Ukraine. More than three decades later, these sites continue to attract visitors and generate new meanings. At the same time, they have become focal points for debates about the place of Soviet cultural heritage in societies that are increasingly divided by competing memory regimes, geopolitical conflicts, and processes of decolonization.

In heritage studies, scholars understand heritage not as a fixed collection of valuable objects but as a process through which societies decide what should be remembered, preserved, and publicly displayed. Heritage is therefore always political. It raises questions of authority, participation, and ownership: Who has the right to define cultural value? Which pasts deserve preservation? And who controls public memory? The commemorative practices surrounding Viktor Tsoi demonstrate that these questions remain particularly contentious when the past in question is both shared and politically contested.

From Soviet Rock to Cultural Heritage

Soviet rock emerged during the 1970s and 1980s within a semi-legal cultural environment shaped by censorship, informal recording networks, and institutions such as rock clubs. In cities like Leningrad (later St. Petersburg), Moscow, and Sverdlovsk (later Ekaterinburg), it developed through dense networks of musicians, organizers, journalists, and fans. By the late 1980s, musicians such as Viktor Tsoi had become cultural icons. Songs like Peremen (“Changes”) and Gruppa krovi (“Blood Type”) captured the atmosphere of late Soviet transformation and quickly acquired political and generational significance.

Viktor Tsoi, 1986 (public domain).

Tsoi’s sudden death in a car accident near Jūrmala in August 1990 at the age of 28 triggered an immediate wave of public mourning. Fans created spontaneous memorials across the Soviet Union: walls covered in inscriptions, informal shrines, commemorative gatherings, and anniversary rituals. These practices emerged at precisely the moment when the Soviet state itself was collapsing. As a result, Tsoi memorials became associated not only with musical memory but also with experiences of political rupture and transition. Over time, however, these vernacular forms of remembrance gradually attracted the attention of municipal authorities, cultural institutions, and tourism industries. This transition from informal memory to institutionalized heritage has generated numerous conflicts, particularly around questions of control and ownership.

Moscow: The Tsoi Wall as a Site of Conflict

The most famous example is the Tsoi Wall on Moscow’s Arbat Street. Covered in graffiti, drawings, signatures, and offerings, it remains an active place of gathering and commemoration. The wall’s openness is central to its significance. Visitors are expected to participate materially by adding inscriptions or interacting with existing ones. Yet this openness also makes the site vulnerable to intervention.

Tsoi Wall in Moscow, June 2018 (photo by the author). Since 1990, the Tsoi Wall in Moscow has functioned as one of the best-known vernacular memorials in the post-Soviet space.

Over the past two decades, the wall has repeatedly become the object of conflicts between fans, city authorities, artists, and political groups. In 2009, Moscow authorities proposed “restoring” the wall as part of a reconstruction project on Arbat Street. The plan would have replaced much of its vernacular character with a more controlled memorial format, prompting protests from fans and local residents.

The wall has also acquired political significance beyond music itself. Since the 2010s, Peremen has become closely associated with protest cultures in Russia, while the wall’s central location has transformed it into a visible platform for oppositional expression. However, more recently, Tsoi’s image has been incorporated into official patriotic narratives. State-supported exhibitions and new monuments increasingly present him as part of Russia’s national cultural canon.

At the same time, the Tsoi Wall continues to resist full institutional institutionalisation. In 2025, municipal workers again attempted to “restore” the site by replacing much of the graffiti with an official portrait of Tsoi. Fans immediately repainted the wall. This recurring cycle of erasure and re-inscription demonstrates that the wall functions not as a static monument but as an ongoing process of material participation.

Tsoi Wall in Moscow, March 2026 (published with kind permission of the author’s colleague).

Belarus: Protest, Risk, and Urban Space

In Belarus, Tsoi memorials have become deeply intertwined with political protest. The Tsoi Wall in Minsk, established shortly after the musician’s death, has repeatedly been monitored, restricted, or partially dismantled by authorities.

The political significance of Tsoi’s legacy intensified during the “silent protests” of 2011 and especially during the protests of 2020–2021. During these events, Peremen functioned as an unofficial protest anthem. It was played from mobile phones, car speakers, and apartment windows during demonstrations. Since then, the Tsoi Wall has remained an important spot for fans, but it is under camera surveillance.

Tsoi Wall in Minsk, March 2025 (photo by the author).

One of the most famous protest locations became the so-called “Square of Change” in Minsk – a residential courtyard named after Tsoi’s song. Decorated with murals and protest symbols, the courtyard hosted concerts, discussions, and acts of collective solidarity.

Soviet rock heritage thus became both an infrastructure of protest and an infrastructure of risk. Walls, courtyards, songs, and gathering places enabled political communication and collective identity, while simultaneously attracting increased state surveillance and persecution. Authorities treated these sites not merely as cultural objects but as politically dangerous spaces.

Kazakhstan and Latvia: Between Heritage and Belonging

Kazakhstan and Latvia highlight another important dimension of Soviet rock heritage: the place of Russian-language popular music in societies that are actively redefining their relationships with the Soviet past. Unlike Russia and Belarus, where Tsoi’s memory is closely intertwined with contemporary political conflicts, these cases raise broader questions about cultural ownership, linguistic heritage, and belonging. They demonstrate that Soviet rock cannot be understood simply as “Russian culture.” Instead, it occupies an ambiguous position between national, Soviet, and transnational forms of cultural memory.

In Kazakhstan, the commemoration of Viktor Tsoi has largely taken the form of institutionalized memorialization. In 2018, a monument to Tsoi was unveiled in Almaty at the site where scenes from Rashid Nugmanov’s film Igla (The Needle; 1988), starring Tsoi, were filmed. The monument has become a place of pilgrimage where visitors leave flowers, sing songs, and gather on anniversaries. Yet its significance extends beyond the memory of a single musician. Tsoi occupies a distinctive position within Kazakhstan’s cultural landscape: he is remembered simultaneously as a Soviet rock icon, a figure connected to the history of Kazakh cinema, and a symbol of a shared cultural space that transcends contemporary national borders.

Tsoi monument in Almaty, July 2024 (published with kind permission of the author’s colleague).

A different dynamic can be observed in Latvia. Here, the central commemorative site is the monument near Jūrmala marking the location of Tsoi’s fatal car accident. Unlike highly visible urban memorials, this roadside monument has largely been maintained through transnational fan initiatives rather than state institutions. Fans from Latvia, Estonia, and other post-Soviet countries continue to visit the site, organize commemorative events, and participate in restoration projects. The Latvian case foregrounds a less spectacular but no less political dimension of heritage conflict: not open confrontation over symbolic meaning, but ongoing struggles over who is willing and able to care for material traces of a contested past.

Tsoi monument in Talsi, March 2026 (photo by the author).

Ukraine and the Politics of Translation

Ukraine presents perhaps the most complex case. During the Euromaidan protests in 2013, Peremen was widely performed both in Russian and in Ukrainian translation. At the same time, the political context after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 has profoundly transformed perceptions of Soviet and Russian-language cultural symbols.

Memorials associated with Tsoi still exist in cities such as Kyiv, Dnipro, Kharkiv, and Odessa, but they have become sensitive sites. In Kyiv, the so-called “Tsoi Tree,” associated with the filming of a 1980s movie featuring Tsoi, was officially protected as a natural monument in 2020. Yet after 2022, commemorative plaques were removed, and gatherings around the site became more politically contentious.

Tsoi tree, Kyiv, September 2020, photo: AnatolyPm, Creative Commons.

Heritage as Materialized Conflict

The story of Soviet rock heritage demonstrates that the value of the past is never fixed. It emerges through ongoing struggles over memory, participation, and ownership. Walls, monuments, songs, and memorial sites become meaningful not because they preserve an uncontested past, but because different actors continually invest them with new interpretations and political significance.

The case of Viktor Tsoi reveals how a shared Soviet cultural legacy continues to circulate across national borders even as those borders become extremely politically charged. More than three decades after his death, the conflicts surrounding Tsoi’s memorials remind us that heritage is not simply inherited from the past. It is continually made, contested, and remade in the present.


Literature

Basik, S. (2023). “Vernacular Place Name as a Cultural Arena of Urban Place-Making and Symbolic Resistance in Minsk, Belarus,” Urban Geography, 44(8), 1825–1832.

Bennett, A., & Janssen, S. (eds.) (2019). Popular Music, Cultural Memory, and Heritage. London: Routledge.

Brandellero, A., & Janssen, S. (2014). “Popular Music as Cultural Heritage: Scoping Out the Field of Practice.” International Journal of Heritage Studies, 20(3), 224–240.

Cushman, T. (1995). Notes from Underground: Rock Music Counterculture in Russia. Albany: SUNY Press.

Hansen, A., Rogatchevski, A., Steinholt, Y., Wickström D.-E. (2019) A War of Songs: Popular Music and Recent Russia-Ukraine Relations. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.

Robertson, I. (ed.) (2016). Heritage from Below. London: Routledge.

Smith, L. (2006). Uses of Heritage. London: Routledge.

Zaporozhets, O., & Kolesnik, A. (2020). “Music Geography in Russia: Non-Auratic Places and Institutionalization ‘in Becoming’,” Journal of Cultural Geography, 37(1), 1–25.


Title picture: Tsoi Wall in Moscow with a mosaic of Tsoi, June 2017 (photo by the author).

Sind ethnologische Museen „dekoloniale Erinnerungsorte“?

Stefanie Bach und Kevin Breß reflektieren über die Neuausrichtung des GRASSI Museum für Völkerkunde zu Leipzig.

Was für ein Ort ist das ethnologische Museum? Das GRASSI Museum für Völkerkunde zu Leipzig wagt neue Wege, um Kulturgüter aus kolonialen Kontexten, verdrängte Geschichten und vielfältige Stimmen sichtbar zu machen – und stellt sich dabei unbequemen Fragen zur eigenen Rolle.

What kind of place is the ethnological museum? The GRASSI Museum für Völkerkunde zu Leipzig is taking new paths to make cultural artefacts from colonial contexts, silenced histories, and diverse voices visible – while confronting uncomfortable questions about its own role.


Wie kann eine dekoloniale Erinnerungskultur in einem ethnologischen Museum gelebt werden? Diese Frage klingt zunächst abstrakt – doch muss sie gestellt werden, denn im aktuellen Koalitionsvertrag der 21. Legislaturperiode des Bundestages heißt es im Zusammenhang mit der Aufarbeitung des Kolonialismus: „Besonderes Augenmerk liegt auf einem würdigen Erinnerungsort“. Doch wie kann solch ein Erinnerungsort aussehen? Werden hier Kunstwerke, heilige und geheime Dinge sowie Alltagsobjekte, die einst durch koloniale Gewalt in europäische Museen gelangten, gezeigt? Oder Geschichten reproduziert, die lange Zeit nur von europäischen weißen Stimmen erzählt wurden? Oder sollte vielmehr die Frage im Mittelpunkt stehen, wie konkrete Orte diese auf die Kolonialzeit bezogene Erinnerungsarbeit ausführen sollen? Denn diese gibt es ja: Als Speicher der kolonialen Vergangenheit kommt den ethnologischen Museen die Aufgabe zu, Raum für gesellschaftliche Debatten zu bieten, in denen sie die Verantwortung über die eigene Geschichte übernehmen und Diskurse und Stimmen zulassen, welche bisher jedoch entweder nicht geführt oder zum Schweigen gebracht wurden.

Das GRASSI Museum für Völkerkunde zu Leipzig ringt genau damit. Gegründet 1869, wuchs seine Sammlung allein zwischen 1899 und 1926 von 30.000 auf insgesamt 150.000 Inventareinträge. Das war die Zeit, als das Deutsche Kaiserreich Kolonien in Afrika, Ozeanien und Asien als sogenannte „Schutzgebiete“ unterhielt – mit allen Formen von Unterdrückung, Gewalt und Ausbeutung. Ein Großteil der Museumsbestände stammt aus diesem Zeitraum. Viele Provenienzen sind und bleiben wahrscheinlich auch in Zukunft unklar. Darüber hinaus wurde lange nur über die Herkunftsgesellschaften gesprochen, anstatt sie selbst sprechen zu lassen.

Der Raum „Aneignungen“ setzt sich mit der Geschichte des Museums auseinander. Er zeigt Dinge, die während der Zeit Karl Weules in das Museum kamen. Foto: ©Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden, Tom Dachs

Seit 2021 versucht das GRASSI mit dem Zukunftsprojekt REINVENTING GRASSI neue Antworten zu finden. Diese institutionelle Selbsterkundung, die tief in die eigene Geschichte reicht, ist ein Experiment, das die Frage stellt: Wie kann ein Museumstyp, der während der Kolonialzeit zur heutigen Größe angewachsen ist, dekolonial gedacht werden, ohne dass ein ausschließlich neues Narrativ über das Alte gestülpt wird?

Museum als Ort gesellschaftlicher Aushandlung

Ethnologische Museen besitzen eine geschichtlich begründete einzigartige Ausgangslage für diese Auseinandersetzung. Die in ihnen ruhenden Dinge sind Zeugen einer „entangled history“. Das heißt, dass sich, neben ihren bisherigen historischen Schichten, auch die deutsche Kolonialzeit in ihre Biografie eingeschrieben hat. Deshalb sind die Dinge in einem ethnologischen Museum mehr als Zeugnisse globaler Gemeinschaften. Sie sind ein Vehikel, um bisher unsichtbare außereuropäische Perspektiven sichtbar zu machen. Deshalb setzt das GRASSI auf Zusammenarbeit: Vertreter:innen von Herkunftsgesellschaften oder Menschen mit einem biografischen Zugang zu den Dingen übernehmen im Rahmen des Zukunftsprogrammes selbst Deutungsmacht oder ganze Ausstellungsflächen. Sie erzählen ihre Geschichten, definieren Themen und setzen Debatten. So bricht das Museum bewusst mit gewohnten Sehgewohnheiten – ein Prozess, der nicht ohne Spannungen abläuft. Diese Vorgehensweise ist nicht unproblematisch und scheitert an vielen Stellen auch an den Ansprüchen der Partner:innen oder des Museums. Aber es kann ein Anfang sein, damit das ethnologische Museum der Zukunft eine bessere Form seiner selbst werden kann – als globalgeschichtliche Institution oder besser als ein „kulturgeschichtliches Museum der besonderen Art“, wie es Léontine Meijer-van Mensch ausdrückte (Direktorin 2019 – 2024).

Es gibt nicht wenige Menschen, die bis heute in ein Völkerkundemuseum mit klaren Erwartungen kommen: Die Welt im Kleinen bereisen oder “Fremdes“ bestaunen. Diese Erwartungshaltung wurde in einer Zeit geprägt, in der Museen als Fenster in „ferne Welten“ dienten, die die meisten Menschen selbst nie bereisen konnten. Besonders zur Zeit der DDR (1949-1990) war das GRASSI Museum ein Ort gedanklicher Fernreisen. 2025 sind diese Horizonte theoretisch nur einen Klick entfernt, Reisen prinzipiell möglich und doch bleibt die Sehnsucht nach dem Anderen oder zumindest dem „originalen Objekt“. Bedenklich wird es, wenn diese Sehnsucht durch eine eindeutige Dominanzposition geprägt wird.

Doch ist diese im Globalen Norden verbreitete Erwartungshaltung auch Teil eines tiefergehenden Problems. Sie stützt sich auf ein koloniales Erbe, welches Menschen im Globalen Süden häufig als Objekte der Betrachtung positioniert. Das Museum muss sich daher fragen: Wer spricht hier eigentlich über wen? Und wer wird gehört?

Polyphone Stimmen und Aushandlungen

Im Projekt REINVENTING GRASSI heißt das: weg von vermeintlicher Objektivität, die gewohnheitsgemäß eine europäische Geschichtsinterpretation ist. Wir verhandeln Wissen gemeinsam mit Vertreter:innen von Herkunftsgesellschaften neu. Das Museum versteht sich nicht mehr als belehrende Institution, sondern als lernende. Es geht nicht darum, eine einzige Interpretation zu vermitteln, vielmehr sollen verschiedene Stimmen und Perspektiven nebeneinander gezeigt werden. Auch wenn das bedeutet, dass sie einander widersprechen. Ein Gegenstand zum Beispiel kann im Laufe seiner Existenz aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln betrachtet und immer wieder mit neuen Bedeutungen aufgeladen werden.

Ist damit bereits ein wesentlicher Bestandteil eines dekolonialen Erinnerungsortes beschrieben? Denn neben der Beschreibung der Dinge geht das Museum entlang historischer Geschehnisse auch auf die Gewaltgeschichte des Kolonialismus aus der Betroffenenperspektive ein. Damit können Erinnerungsorte Räume der Verantwortungsübernahme werden – gegenüber und gemeinsam mit den Herkunftsgesellschaften, deren kulturelles Erbe sich in den Museen befindet. Dadurch werden sie auch zu Lernorten für die Menschen, deren Wissen über den Kolonialismus, u.a. wegen der faktischen Auslassung als Zeitepoche im Lehrplan, defizitär ist.

Das Beispiel Benin-Bronzen

Zeitstrahl zur Geschichte der Rückforderungsbemühungen, Foto: ©Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden, Tom Dachs

Ein prägnantes Beispiel ist die Präsentation der Benin-Bronzen im Museum. Zwar können die Bronzen als sekundäres Raubgut angesehen werden, da sie nicht unmittelbar durch deutsche, im Kolonialdienst agierende Akteur:innen angeeignet wurden, allerdings lagert heute in Deutschland mit über eintausend Stück einer der größten Bestände an Benin-Bronzen weltweit. Die ersten Benin-Bronzen, die durch die Plünderung der britischen Kolonialmacht 1897 nach Europa kamen, hielten bereits 1898 Einzug in die Sammlung des GRASSI. So thematisiert der Ausstellungsraum dezidiert die koloniale (Raub)Geschichte der Bronzen. Über die Plünderung, den Erwerb und die Ausstellungsgeschichte hinaus, zeigt die Präsentation – auf Initiative des nigerianischen Künstlers Emeka Ogboh – auch die Geschichte der Rückgabebestrebungen Nigerias, und damit auch die des Widerstands, auf. Daneben kuratierte der aus Benin City stammende Künstler Enotie Paul Ogbebor eine Präsentation an Benin-Bronzen im Zusammenspiel mit seinen eigenen Werken.

Die Kuratorin, Dichterin und Forscherin Mary Osaretin Omoregie erinnert in ihrer Intervention an die weibliche Vergangenheit des Königreichs. Damit stellt sie erstmals in der Ausstellungsgeschichte des Museums die feministische Geschichte der Bronzen dar. Feministische Strömungen sind bis heute in der Geschichtsschreibung des Königreichs unterrepräsentiert, obwohl Frauen einen wichtigen Beitrag zu dessen politischen, kulturellen und künstlerischen Erbe leisteten und damit einen wichtigen Baustein für eine dekoloniale Erinnerungskultur bilden. Die Geschichten aus dem Leben der Iyoba Idia, Emotan oder der Königin Iden zeigen allesamt Personen, die sich den Normen einer patriarchalischen Gesellschaft widersetzten und den Lauf der Geschichte maßgeblich beeinflussten.

So vergegenwärtigt der Objektbestand des Museums aus dem ehemaligen Königreich Benin einerseits die Geschichte des Königreichs und dessen kulturelles Erbe, andererseits zeugt er von kolonialer Aneignung und ungleichen Machtverhältnissen – auch vor Ort – die bis heute vorherrschen. Durch die Übernahme des Ausstellungsortes durch Vertreter:innen der Herkunftsgesellschaften mit ihren Erzählungen und Perspektiven wurde ein Raum geschaffen, in dem dekoloniales Erinnern möglich wird. Dies bricht mit den bisherigen Sehgewohnheiten und Narrativen und schafft gleichzeitig die Voraussetzungen für eine kollektive und kritische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Kolonialismus und damit auch für die Neuausrichtung des Museums. Dekolonisierung ist hier als Prozess der fortwährenden Reflektion angelegt.

Einblick in die von Enotie Paul Ogbebor kuratierte Präsentation ausgewählter Benin-Bronzen. Foto: ©Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden, Tom Dachs

Ein lernendes Museum

Das Museum befindet sich seit 2021 auf einer Reise, deren Ziel bisher nicht absehbar ist, und so sehr das Museum neue Wege sucht – die Realität bleibt komplex: Außereuropäische Perspektiven werden zugelassen und eurozentrische Sichtweisen aufgebrochen. Das bedeutet für uns hier in Deutschland aber auch auszuhalten, dass Perspektiven kollidieren und dass das Museum nicht mehr der unangefochtene Deutungsort ist, der er einmal war. Das Ziel von Konzepten wie REINVENTING GRASSI ist nicht, eine universelle Lösung für das ethnologische Museum zu finden, sondern Räume zu schaffen, in denen Gespräche möglich werden. Räume, in denen sich Museumsbesuchende bewusst mit ihrer eigenen Geschichte im Verhältnis zu anderen Geschichten auseinandersetzen können und in denen Herkunftsgesellschaften selbst sprechen. Es geht um das Mitspracherecht, als Voraussetzung für die Ergründung der gemeinsamen Narrative in einer „Entangled History“ und letztlich um die Stärkung der „Community of Implication“ (Erica Lehrer) als Gemeinschaft, welche Bedeutungen für die Zukunft aushandelt. Damit kann das ethnologische Museum zu einem Ort werden, der an die Vergangenheit erinnert, Bedeutung und Gegenwart verhandelt und Zukunft gestaltet. Darin liegt für uns die Aufgabe eines ethnologischen Museums.


Titelbild: Zeitstrahl zur Geschichte der Rückforderungsbemühungen, Foto: ©Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden, Tom Dachs

Remembering What Was Forgotten: Language, Religion, and the City in Dinara Rasuleva’s Travmagochi

Diliara Brileva reviews Dinara Rasuleva’s novel Travmagochi (2025) which explores how memories of post-Soviet Tatar identity are shaped in the 1990s.

This blog post reviews Dinara Rasuleva’s Travmagochi (2025), a novel at the crossroads of fiction and autofiction, engaging deeply with the themes of memory and oblivion. It explores how language, religion, and the city of Kazan in the 1990s shape personal and collective memories of post-Soviet Tatar identity.

Dieser Blogbeitrag rezensiert Dinara Rasulevas Roman Travmagochi (2025), der sich, an der Schnittstelle zwischen Fiktion und Autofiktion, intensiv mit den Themen Erinnerung und Vergessen auseinandersetzt. Der Roman untersucht, wie Sprache, Religion und die Stadt Kasan in den 1990er Jahren die persönlichen und kollektiven Erinnerungen der postsowjetischen tatarischen Identität prägen.


WHOEVER WANTS TO, LET THEM REMEMBER.

(KTO KHOCHET PUST’ POMNIT.)

(Dinara Rasulеva, Travmagochi, p. 20)


To remember or not to remember – that is the question. But how can one recall, if the choice to forget has already once been made? The heroine of the novel, Dilyara, in Dinara Rasuleva’s Travmagochi (a title formed from the words “trauma” and Tamagotchi, the popular 1990s toy), lives in a parallel Berlin and finds herself working under a personified Death. Having once agreed by contract to forget her past, she nevertheless decides to reclaim it. And, despairing of remembering, she invents her past anew.

Cover of Dinara Rasulova’s book Travmagochi (shell(f), 2025).

The book was published in 2025 by shell(f), a digital and small-press publisher of Russian-language fiction, essays, autofiction, and cross-genre writing that explores the universal human experiences of coming-of-age, (metaphorical and literal) migration, loss, vulnerability, and professional or scholarly life. The novel stands at the intersection of fiction, autofiction, and memory studies and, given the near absence of academic work on Tatar memory in the post-Soviet context, represents an important contribution to the discussion of memory studies in this discursive field.

Since the novel is not an academic text, I will attempt to single out and discuss its work with memory in relation to language, religion, and space, separating fiction and the emotional, auto-therapeutic layer from the analytical layer. I will try to show how Rasuleva, through her novel, remembers while openly calling this process the construction of memory about language, religion, and the city of childhood.

If I had to answer in a single word what this novel is about, I would say it is about memory, oblivion, and the return of memory through recollection. In the book, this is the painful process of reclaiming one’s childhood and youth, family, native language, and “one’s own” religion, all rejected after the multiple trauma of losing loved ones.

The theme of death runs as a red thread through the entire novel. The narrative centers on the loss of loved ones, which marks the boundary between the heroine’s “past” and “new” life. Death appears both as a character, episodically taking the role of Dilyara’s superior, and as the emotional driving force of the plot: the book reads as a work of mourning for a threefold loss and as the point of departure for oblivion.

In the novel, the past takes on a corporeal form in the shape of a fantastical organ, the saq-soq bladder, in which traumatic memories are preserved and from which they are released. In Tatar folklore, however, Saq and Soq are twin brothers cursed by their mother to live as birds, condemned to eternal separation until the Day of Judgment. Rasuleva’s image of the “saq-soq bladder” seems to reimagine this myth: it functions almost like a repository of trauma, symbolizing the heroine’s deepest wound – the loss of her parents. The past must be released into the world, for it can no longer remain inside. Yet the question remains whether the past contains anything beyond personal trauma. At the same time, the layers of memory connected to the city as a stage, to language, and to religion form an entire field of inquiry.

Kazan

The work of memory takes place in Berlin, where the heroine of the novel begins a new life, having completely severed her ties with the city of her childhood and forgotten her past. That past, which Dilyara struggles to reclaim, is bound up with Kazan.

Panoramic view of Kazan with the Kremlin and Kul Sharif (Qol Şärif) Mosque.

Rasuleva does not say much about Kazan in the 1990s. What she describes are family and school, a childhood that unfolded during years of social upheaval. The behavior, attitudes, emotions of the characters, and even their words bear the imprint of the collective fear and hope that saturated the atmosphere of large cities in post-Soviet Russia.

The author introduces recognizable toponyms of Kazan – Gabishev, 8th of March, Safiullin, and Dauriya Streets, as well as Gorky Park. Yet the city reveals itself more through the spirit of the time than through concrete space. As a result, what emerges before the reader is the image of a large Russian city of the 1990s.

The heroine’s family is portrayed through the archetypal figures of the era: a father who “went into business in the mid-1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the ghostly free future flickered in neon, luring the ambitious and the reckless with its glittering lights” (Dinara Rasuleva, Travmagochi, p. 101); a mother, weeping and fearing the loss of their apartment; and a brother, drawn into the criminal underworld. Together, these figures recreate the atmosphere of social collapse and the criminalization of everyday life.

The pervasive fear and anxiety, yet at the same time the sense of freedom and hope, point to the collective experience of post-Soviet Kazan. In this sense, Rasuleva’s city can be read as a chronotope of post-Soviet childhood in Bakhtin’s understanding, a place where time folds in on itself, where the historical 1990s coincide with the heroine’s personal childhood, and where the city becomes a space for experiencing time.

Monument to Musa Jalil (Musa Jälil), the Soviet Tatar poet, located by the Spasskaya Tower of the Kazan Kremlin.

Language

The main emotional driving force of the novel, alongside death, is language, which restores the past. If death appears as a depressive, oppressive, and dark principle, then language, by contrast, is associated with the heroine’s brightest experiences. At the same time, the author demythologizes death, weaving it into everyday life as a way of coming to terms with its power. Memories of the Tatar language connect her to her deceased parents and grandmother: it is the language of home, of care, and of love. Yet within the text there emerges a contrast between the perception of the native language in the familial sphere and in the school setting, where its value is questioned. Thus, in the novel, language functions not only as a medium of memory but also as a point of conflict between the personal and the collective perceptions of it.

Throughout the book, the heroine quite literally tries to reclaim the lost language: she articulates words that come to her in dreams, relearning the sounds. Individual Tatar words and expressions, heard many times i n childhood, turn out to be hidden anchors of memory, holding within them what had seemed irretrievably lost: “…fragments of phrases in a strange, barely perceptible language began little by little to break through into her thoughts, as if a firmly forgotten past were seeping through accidental cracks.” (Travmagochi, p. 12).

Jar of wildflowers from Kazan, an associative image of childhood in the city.

Memories of the native Tatar language in the book are also tied to the experience of discrimination against non-Russian languages in the urban public sphere, even as Tatar remained the language of the family and traditional contexts. Such was the status of a native language for a child from a Tatar family growing up in an urban environment in the 1990s: a Tatar accent in Russian and the pressure to eliminate it, the lack of “prestige” in speaking Tatar, the constant demand to demonstrate flawless command of Russian. The child had to strive for exceptional literacy in order to avoid accusations of “not knowing the main language,” which were immediately followed by reproaches about “non-Russian origin.” Yet it is impossible to stop being who you are.

Through the heroine’s work with personal memory and trauma, a political dimension also emerges, likewise tied to language. The episode with a sticker in Tatar reading “millät betä” (“the nation is disappearing”; Travmagochi, p. 7), which Dilyara finds tucked inside a volume of Clarice Lispector in the pocket of an old coat, is placed at the very beginning of the book. Were it not for the text’s emotional focus on death, trauma, and loss, this episode could well have been given pride of place: it points to the loss of something native, bound up with language and roots.

The sharpest reference to the theme of disappearing languages appears in the figure of the heroine’s acquaintance, Lyokha, wearing a red shirt emblazoned with the words “The Komi do not believe in death” (Travmagochi, p. 115). This phrase, associated with the worldview of Finno-Ugric peoples, in the light of recent history inevitably recalls the self-immolation of the Udmurt scholar and activist Albert Razin, who in September 2019 set himself on fire in front of the State Council of the Udmurt Republic in Izhevsk as a protest against language restrictions. In this historical context, the slogan on a red background reads as a metaphor of political memory and interethnic solidarity in the face of the erasure of Russia’s indigenous languages.

Finally, the very choice of language in the novel and the way it is used underscore the author’s special relationship to language. To let a marginalized non-Russian language into a Russian-language text is to signal an emotional attachment to it. The main language of the work is Russian, with small but poetically expressive insertions of Tatar, English, and German. The Tatar fragments do not seek to conform to the norms of the modern literary language: they reproduce “childhood memory,” the pronunciation and intonations preserved in recollection.

Religion

Among all that was forgotten and later brought back in memory, religion holds an important place. It appears in a very specific form – in the spirit of what Adeeb Khalid has called “Islam after Communism” (2007). Kazan in the novel is not depicted as a center of religious revival, yet the reader senses how religion quietly and steadily makes its presence felt in the city and expands. “A mosque appeared right in the courtyard of the new house, behind the minimarket, and Father, out of convenience and proximity, seemed to start dropping in there little by little…” (Travmagochi, p. 44). Beginning in the early 1990s, Kazan itself gradually became dotted first with old, newly reopened mosques, and later with new ones. In the novel, the appearance of a mosque “behind the minimarket,” within the everyday reach of the heroine and her family, renders religion visible and almost (in the imagination) audible to the reader through the azan (call to prayer) that fills the city’s space.

Nevertheless, for Dilyara religion becomes an important part of her memories above all through the inner space of the home: the “golden picture with Qur’anic verses” hanging in the place of honor in the living room; the funeral meals (ash) with Qur’an recitation and the mutual distribution of sädaqa (voluntary almsgiving), a word the heroine remembered in childhood as sälähä; but most of all through the prayers she learned by heart with her grandmother. Recalling these key surahs and ayahs of Islamic practice, the heroine remarks: “It amazes me to think that these words have meanings. As a child I knew them as incantations; they did not need meaning.” (Travmagochi, p. 62). This is another feature of post-communist Islam: after decades of atheist practice, religion was remembered anew. Since the level of involvement of the Tatar Muslim population varied greatly, and not everyone wished to attend mosque or study Arabic, prayers were often transcribed into Cyrillic and circulated in pamphlets and small booklets. Pronunciation in such sources was approximate, and although the transcription was accompanied by a translation of the original sense, the texts were in practice memorized “like incantations.”

A view of a mosque under construction in the Aviastroitelny District of Kazan, marking the expansion of Islamic space in the urban landscape.

Another aspect, tied less to doctrine than to the broader sphere of religiously inflected tradition, is the memory of shame, understood as an important, and above all gendered, emotion of the heroine’s childhood. It stemmed from the way girls were raised, a form of upbringing that, after the Soviet decades, was no longer seen as explicitly religious but still carried its traditional moral force. “…Shame, shame, shame / It has always been there.” (Travmagochi, p. 106). The repeatedly invoked Tatar word oyat (shame), embedded in a Russian sentence, appears here as the recollection of a deeply imprinted feeling that seems to pulse through the text. It is untranslatable, inseparably tied to language and family. Recalling and reinterpreting this feeling in adulthood, Dilyara brings out new shades of meaning in it, extending even into the political.


And yet the result of the heroine’s work with the past remains unconvincing. She wavers and begins to question: “Is my past, too, nothing more than a roughly glued collage? Memory is full of holes and blurred fragments spoiled by time, like a scratched cassette tape. The pieces do not always fit together into a whole. What emerges crackles, flails, tries to cohere. But what if these are fragments of different mosaics?” (Travmagochi, p. 56).

As one reads, there inevitably arises the expectation of an allusion to the well-known passage in the Kyrgyz author Chingiz Aitmatov’s novel The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years (1980) about the mankurt, and yet it never appears. The mankurt is the image of a person who has forgotten the past, or more precisely, of one whose memory has been violently taken away. This figure has become so firmly embedded in the discourse and languages of the post-Soviet Turkic world that it has turned into almost a cliché. But the answer comes gradually: the mankurt, and the forgetting of one’s own past, is always about power, about the deprivation of will through the deprivation of memory. In Rasuleva’s novel, however, power and resistance do not become central themes; they remain part of personal memory rather than emerging as an explicit political discourse, as in the Tatar nationalist rhetoric of the 1990s.

In any case, the book becomes a valuable addition to the corpus of artistic explorations of memory and an important read for those engaged in the study of Tatarstan in the 1990s. And above all, to recall Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion from Wahrheit und Methode (1960): understanding presupposes a “fusion of horizons” between the interpreter and the text.


References

Aitmatov, Chingiz. I dolshe veka dlitsya den’ / The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years (1980).

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (1960).

Khalid, Adeeb. Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia (2007).

Rasuleva, Dinara. Travmagochi (2025).


Title picture: Suyumbike Tower, Kazan.

All pictures by Diliara Brileva.

The Politics of Teaching Conflict: Memory and Education in Kenya

Auf Grundlage von Interviews mit kenianischen Pädagog:innen untersucht Meredith Whye die Rolle der Schulbildung in Kenia für einen stabilen Frieden.

Kenya has worked to position itself as a global and regional peace maker, however these efforts stand in contrast to its ability to handle peace internally. Continued political violence has impacted Kenyan governance, yet new school curricula remain largely silent, particularly on the 2007/2008 post-election violence and broader patterns of state repression. Despite total education overhaul, education in Kenya avoids addressing past conflicts instead using vague calls for peace. Drawing on interviews with Kenyan educators, post-conflict education in Kenya will be examined as a vehicle for peace that ignores the question of why peace is needed.

From Post-Election Violence to Education Reform

Widely seen as an example of stability in a high-conflict region, the violence that followed Kenya’s disputed 2007 presidential election shook not only the nation but the world. The announcement of President Mwai Kibaki’s re-election sparked allegations of fraud, leading to widespread protests along ethnic lines and state-sponsored violence. In the violence that followed, over 1,500 people were killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. The violence had lasting impacts on Kenya, most notably a new Constitution in 2010. Largely seen as a resolution to the political violence of 2007/2008, the Constitution set in motion longer-term policy implications.

The Constitution and policy guide, Kenya Vision 2030, called for education reform. Due to the slow nature of Kenyan legislation, complete educational reform in Kenya only gradually became reality. After a series of working papers, reports, and a nation-wide needs-assessment, the new Competency-Based Curriculum (CBC) was implemented in 2021. Notably, the reform shifted Kenya’s content-based and assessment-focused structure to a competency-based approach. Kenya is one of the last nations in the East African region to reform their educational curriculum to this new standard of ‘best practices.’

Despite Kenya’s domestic struggles, Kenya has positioned itself as a regional and global peace broker, mediating conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC), and more recently, leading peacekeeping efforts in Haiti. Yet, while advocating for stability abroad, Kenya’s new CBC avoids engaging with its violent past. The reform promises to create “engaged, empowered and ethical citizens,” and to “avert the behavioural and values crisis in the country.” However, policy documents do not specify which crises or why they occur in the first place. Instead, the first goal of Kenya’s national education calls for peace and unity:

Kenyan Education should: Foster nationalism, patriotism, and promote national unity. Kenya’s people belong to different communities, races and religions and should be able to live and interact as one people. It should also promote peace and harmonious co-existence.

Allusions to crisis and the timeline of publication suggest that the 2007 post-election violence played a crucial role in reshaping Kenya’s education policy. However, this is not taken up by curriculum policies, texts, or materials. Instead of acknowledging the political violence or its causes, such as ethnicity, land disputes, or corruption, the curriculum does not engage with political violence nor times of crisis in Kenya’s history. This domestic avoidance is striking given Kenya’s peacekeeping efforts, where it has sought to promote stability in conflict zones like the DRC.

Instead, in the name of fostering peace, the CBC broadly emphasizes cohesion, unity, and patriotism, leaving out any mention of past or current political violence. However, avoiding discussions of political violence does not create neutral citizens. Rather, it leaves young people to absorb the narratives available in their communities, which can be biased or incomplete. By neglecting these difficult topics, Kenyan education fails to provide students with tools needed to understand the structures that sustain conflict.

A Kenyan classroom. Photo: Meredith Whye.

Silencing Conflict

Teaching contested pasts has been extensively studied in high-conflict and politically extreme cases, such as Germany, Rwanda, and South Africa. In these cases, the selection of memories and versions of the past depicted in textbooks are hotly debated. While these cases present strong examples of how different nations grapple with their contentious histories, Kenya presents a different case. Kenya has experienced low-intensity but persistent political violence, especially during presidential election cycles.

Despite the shock of the 2007 political violence, it neither began nor ended then. Political violence has permeated Kenyan society since colonialism, creating a population that has, as Daniel Branch writes, “become accustomed to endemic social and political violence.” This may explain why, in Kenya, politicians have not been held accountable for past human rights violations, nor for inciting violence. Despite his alleged role in the 2007 post-election violence, current Kenyan president William Ruto saw his ICC case dropped, further reinforcing a culture of impunity. His political rise, shaped by shifting alliances and ethnic power dynamics, reflects broader patterns in Kenya’s governance. Therefore, what is taught in Kenya (and what is left out) becomes interesting in light of continued political violence, the lack of accountability, and control of official narratives.

Yet the exclusion of political violence from educational curricula does not mean young Kenyans are unaware of it. Instead, they encounter it in their daily lives—through protests, media, and their communities. This contributes to growing generational tensions in Kenya, where older political leaders view the youth as a destabilizing force. Indeed, the widening age gap between “geriatric leaders and restless youth” is a major source of political tension across the African continent. Rather than empowering young people for civic engagement, political elites often frame them as needing control and containment.

Approaches to contentious pasts

Falk Pingel of the Leibniz Institute for Educational Media, identified three broad approaches to handling contentious histories following a period of national conflict: Separation – Avoiding difficult historical truths, Harmonization – Presenting a national past that smooths over conflict, and Multiperspectivity – Encouraging a critical and nuanced engagement with history.

Separation involves adopting one-sided narratives, often perpetuating conflict by reinforcing competing “truths,” such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the 1992–1995 war. Harmonization seeks to impose a singular, unifying national narrative, as attempted in Rwanda. Rwanda promoted a vision of unity, but efforts to produce new textbooks ultimately failed. Multiperspectivity encourages dialogue between conflicting historical perspectives, treating history as an evolving, communicative process. This approach was pursued in South Africa after Apartheid.

What happens when a new curriculum does none of these? Kenya is a case in point: with little mention of Kenya’s post-independence history, educators are left to decide if and how they cover current issues.

Dilemmas in Teaching Political Violence

Teachers often find themselves in a difficult position—faced with the realities of continued political violence but with educational materials that ‘sanitize’ Kenya’s past. This leaves teachers to individually contend with how they approach teaching conflict. Emma, a Kenyan primary teacher and scholar, wrestles with teaching political violence:

“Are we talking more violence? Am I going to put more on the violence or talk about peace? What brings peace and helps people? I would concentrate more on things that bring us together… What is peace? How do we bring peace? And what are the benefits of peace?”

For Emma, teaching should be about fostering inclusion and promoting harmony, without negativity. She questions the necessity of teaching about violence in school at all:

“…why am I to teach about the negative? Why don’t I teach about the positive? I would spend my more energy on such things, because if we did them properly, then there should be no violence.”

Kenyan schoolchildren solving exercises. Photo: Meredith Whye.

Conversely, Roger, a teacher educator and university professor, disagrees. He warns against ignoring the issues of Kenya, citing the on-going violence and corruption in Kenya. At the time of these interviews, the Kenyan Vice President, Rigathi Gachagua, was being impeached on accusations of tribalism and ethnic favoritism. On teaching Kenya’s political violence in education, Roger says:

“Let’s talk about reality. The reality here is Kenyans should teach tribalism and all those things in the curriculum and the leaders themselves practice tribalist way of doing things in the government. Because if you say the Vice President is tribal, what about the president? The president has employed all his people in the government, all his people, so it’s a big problem.”

This highlights a continued issue—political violence has not ended. Even if children are not taught about political violence in the classrooms, they are experiencing it via media or in their lived experiences. Peter, an educational practitioner and expert on indigenous education, says:

“Even now, even today, there is conflict in Tana River. Just today, if you read today’s papers, there’s conflict. There is conflict everywhere in Kenya… But the challenge is that children are learning within this conflict. So sometimes you ask, how are they managing their learning? You know, the people come and shoot the school, even kill the children, even kill the teacher, even kill the chief, you see, but the children are still supposed to learn.”

The challenge of education is not simply to determine what is taught but how narratives are framed. In Kenya, where legacies of violence have impacted society long before the 2007, the decision to exclude these events from the curriculum is not incidental—it is political. By avoiding discussions of political violence, the education curriculum risks (or aims at) producing citizens who are unprepared to critically engage with the structures that perpetuate conflict. Ruth, a primary teacher, faces this fact:

“We have to teach from known to unknown, and what we know is those post-election violence…”

Educators charged with developing Kenya’s new curriculum face an important question: should they continue treating education as a peaceful tool without teaching the violent past? The experiences of Emma, Ruth, Roger, and Peter show that this question is not abstract— children are growing up within ongoing political violence, yet their textbooks and teachers remain silent.

If Kenya is truly committed to peace, both internationally and domestically, then its education system must move beyond avoidance and engage with the political realities shaping young Kenyans’ lives. As its recent AU election loss reveals, Kenya is a nation eager to lead but unwilling to confront its internal fractures. Instead of sanitizing the curriculum, Kenyan education should equip students with both the historical information and critical thinking skills required to analyze the roots of conflict, rather than concealing them.


This article was first published on the PRIF blog. Republished with the kind permission of the author and PRIF.


Title picture: While avocating for stability abroad, education in Kenya avoids addressing past concflicts. Photo: Meredith Whye.