In today’s Syria, various groups invoke particular versions of the past to define the nation and/or homeland. What role does the past play in the transition after the regime change in Damascus?
Im heutigen Syrien berufen sich verschiedene Gruppen auf bestimmte Versionen der Vergangenheit, um die Nation/Heimat zu definieren. Welche Rolle spielt die Vergangenheit beim Übergang nach dem Regimewechsel in Damaskus?
After the toppling of Bashar Al-Assad as President of Syria in December 2024, the issue of what directions the unfolding political transition in the country will take has been a key concern for Syrians but also for international political actors and researchers. To explore the question of what role the past plays in the transition, Birgitte Holst, an anthropologist specialised in Syria, hosted an international workshop on “The uses of the past in the political transition in Syria” at ZMO, Berlin, in October 2025. The workshop was made possible through funding from the Leibniz Research Alliance Value of the Past and after the workshop, Birgitte sat down with Heike Liebau, also of ZMO, to discuss key take-away points.
Heike Liebau: Since the overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad, the political situation in Syria has developed rapidly. You suggest that the past plays a key role in these developments. Could you explain how?
Birgitte Holst: The government that has taken power in Syria is headed by Ahmad Al-Sharaa who is the long-time leader of the group HTS (Hay’a Tahrir Al-Sham). HTS also headed the coalition of Arab Sunni Islamist militant groups that executed the attack that toppled Assad. One of the things we have seen from this new government and their supporters is an emphasis on the fact that the state is now led by Sunnis. This goes against the wish of many religious minorities and secular Sunnis to have a more pluralistic state. Around 75% of Syrians are Sunni. They are mainly Arabs but Kurds, Turkmen and Circassians (who are ethnic minorities) are also predominantly Sunni. The remaining 25% of Syrians are religious minorities like Christians, Druze, Shia, Alawis and Ismailis. The divergent positions that various groups take on the question of who should lead the state invoke particular notions about the character of the Syrian nation or people (الشعب السوري) and the homeland (الوطن). These notions are based to some extent on these numbers, but various groups also invoke particular versions of the past to define the nation and/or homeland.

HL: I can imagine that this would not be an easy task, as we also know from other contexts. What does that mean in practice? Can you give an example to illustrate?
BH: Government supporters have for instance invoked a reference to the Umayyad Empire as a historical precedent for the political period Syria is presently in. The Umayyad Empire (661-750) was one of the first Islamic Empires and its capital was Damascus. The reference evokes notions of Islamic greatness as the Umayyads helped spread Islam and took over lands as far away as what is now Spain[1]. The Umayyads still hold a specific significance for Damascus (which is also the present-day Syrian capital). A centre piece of that city is the Umayyad Mosque that stands proud and beautiful in the middle of the old town. When government supporters now claim that the toppling of Assad by Islamist groups amounts to a return of the Umayyads, they are thus suggesting that after decades when it was otherwise Damascus is finally being returned to its rightful rulers. The reference also holds within it a comment on the very recent past. The Umayyad Empire was a Sunni Islamic Empire, and the Shia forces from Iraq that were stationed in Damascus during the civil war (2011-2024) were said to curse the Umayyads. This caused much anguish for Sunnis, especially Sunnis from Damascus, who experienced the presence of these Shia troops as an occupation. They are now pleased that no one can curse the Umayyads in Damascus anymore.


HL: So, if I understand you correctly, this is not an official state version of current events, but the new government is indirectly sanctioning this Sunni vision. Are there counter stories for the idea of a homeland and the role of history?
BH: Minorities and more secularly inclined Sunnis are invoking instead the past of multiethnic and multireligious conviviality. They point to the presence of Christians in Syria before the presence of Muslims. They point to the ways in which all ethnic and sectarian groups have impacted the landscape and culture of Syria. In some villages, Aramaic, the language spoken by Jesus, is still used. Some of the world’s oldest convents and churches are in Syria. Syria has historically been a land in which sectarian and ethnic minorities could find refuge when they fled persecution elsewhere.[2] Leading minority figures and secular intellectuals (Sunnis and otherwise) want this to be the model on which a new Syria is established.
HL: In October 2025, you hosted a workshop at ZMO, Berlin, where you discussed the issue of what renditions of the past various groups of Syrians have invoked as they have made claims about the Syrian state and homeland during the first year after the fall of Assad. What were the themes that emerged?
BH: One key theme was the question of the balance between claims about the past that are meant to address the issue of what Syria is as a whole versus claims about the past that are very particular and shape rather a group identity within the homeland. While supporters of the new government are trying to paint Syria as an Islamic country with significant religious minorities and some leading secular intellectuals are making the case that Syria is rather an ethnic and religious mosaic, some Sunni tribes in the north and some Druze in the south invoke local customs of political leadership or local histories of political conflict to formulate a particularistic political position in the present. Hence, an image of a Syria where some groups are attempting to define the nation while other groups are staking out their own claims to an equal place in the homeland emerged.


HL: What are the wider lessons we can take from this? What is the relevance for the study of other contexts?
BH: Syria is a land that has a historical experience with multiethnic and multireligious conviviality and conflict. This is bound to be an issue when the homeland – or the nation, if you want to use that term – and the state is defined anew. However, the relationship between various forms of multiplicity and the definition of the homeland and state can also be key to political contests in other contexts and a focus on them can therefore provide grounds for comparative research and for thinking across diverse settings. In Denmark we have seen an ongoing and intensifying debate over immigration that really took off in the mid-1990s. One recurrent theme has been the supposedly homogenous character of the Danish people. Some political groups claim that ethnic Danes have inhabited the land for centuries, others point to the Christian traditions that have shaped the cultural and social practices of the Danes for centuries and others again point to the struggles in the 20th century to build a welfare state and secure women’s rights as what defines the Danish nation. On the other side stand political groups that invoke a historical openness to others and a welcoming of those who needed safety as what makes Denmark Denmark. While these references to the past are meant to justify political claims, they also come to shape the political projects of various groups as the values they claim as Danish based on specific renditions of the past then become leitmotifs in their political programs. It is too early to say but it would be interesting to follow whether a similar development will unfold in Syria.
HL: That comparison could perhaps be the topic of another conversation. Thank you very much for these analyses and assessments.
[1] Hourani, Albert. 1991. A History of the Arab Peoples. London: Faber and Faber.
[2] Chatty, Dawn. 2017. Syria: The making and unmaking of a refuge nation. London: Hurst.
Title picture: The revolutionary Syrian flag adorns Al-Hijaz train station in Damascus in February 2025. The station was built in 1913 by the Ottomans but has long seized to be a functioning part of the train net in Syria. Image by Birgitte Holst.
By Heike Liebau, head of the research unit “State and Society”, and Birgitte Holst, associated researcher, both at ZMO, Berlin.




































